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  Law	  
Holger	  Spamann*	  
Abstract:	   I	   review	   the	   empirical	   comparative	   law	   literature	   with	   an	  
emphasis	   on	   quantitative	  work.	   After	   situating	   the	   field	   and	   surveying	  
its	  main	  applications	  to	  date,	  I	  turn	  to	  methodological	  issues.	  I	  discuss	  at	  
length	   the	   obstacles	   to	   causal	   inference	   from	   comparative	   data,	   and	  
caution	   against	   inappropriate	   use	   of	   instrumental	   variables	   and	   other	  
techniques.	   Even	   if	   comparative	  data	   cannot	   identify	   any	   single	   causal	  
theory,	  however,	  they	  are	  extremely	   important	   in	  narrowing	  down	  the	  
set	  of	  plausible	  theories.	  I	  report	  progress	  in	  measurement	  design,	  and	  
suggest	   improvements	   in	   data	   analysis	   and	   interpretation	   using	  
techniques	  from	  other	  fields,	  particularly	  growth	  econometrics.	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1.	   Introduction	  
In	   this	   article,	   I	   review	   the	   literature	   that	   uses	   cross-­‐country	   legal	   data	   to	   test	   causal	   theories	   in	   an	  
explicit	  hypothesis-­‐testing	  framework.	  This	   literature,	  which	  I	  call	  empirical	  comparative	   law	  (ECL),	  has	  
grown	  tremendously	  in	  the	  past	  two	  decades.	  The	  appeal	  of	  ECL	  is	  that	  cross-­‐country	  variation	  is	  large.	  
In	   fact,	   cross-­‐country	  variation	   is	  often	   the	  only	  variation	  available,	  as	  many	  characteristics,	  especially	  
legal	   characteristics,	   are	   fixed	   within	   countries.	   It	   is	   difficult,	   however,	   to	   harness	   this	   variation	   for	  
convincing	  tests	  of	  causal	  effects	  or	  even	  to	  establish	  robust	  associations.	  Randomized	  experiments	  are	  
unavailable,	   “natural	   experiments”	   are	   rare	   at	   best,	   and	   even	   standard	   observational	   studies	   face	  
considerable	  challenges:	  units	  (countries)	  are	  highly	  heterogeneous,	  samples	  are	  small	  (there	  is	  only	  one	  
sample1	  of	  at	  most	  200	  countries),	  and	  data	  are	  sparse	  (i.e.,	  unavailable	  for	  many	  countries	  or	  variables).	  
Moreover,	  replication	  on	  independent	  samples	  is	  generally	  impossible.2	  As	  a	  consequence,	  comparative	  
data	  require	  particularly	  careful	  analysis	  and	  interpretation,	  and	  even	  then	  can	  rarely	  if	  ever	  isolate	  any	  
particular	  causal	  effect.	  Nevertheless,	  they	  can	  considerably	  reduce	  the	  number	  of	  plausible	  effects-­‐-­‐-­‐or	  
so	  I	  here	  argue.	  
The	   vast	   majority	   of	   published	   ECL	   is	   quantitative.	   This	   does	   not	   imply	   that	   qualitative	   comparative	  
evidence	   is	  not	   important-­‐-­‐-­‐far	   from	   it.	  Comparative	  evidence	   is	  most	  powerful	  when	  a	  single	  country	  
provides	  a	  counterexample	  to	  what	  could	  otherwise	  seem	  a	  necessary	  relationship.	  Partially	  because	  of	  
this,	  however,	  most	  nontrivial	   yet	  credible	  hypotheses	  are	  probabilistic	  and	  hence	   lend	   themselves	   to	  
quantitative	  tests	  (Spamann	  2009).	  I	  make	  only	  occasional	  mention	  of	  qualitative	  methods	  in	  this	  survey.	  
Section	  2	  situates	  ECL	  at	  the	  crossroads	  of	  empirical	  legal	  studies,	  comparative	  law,	  and	  sister	  empirical	  
disciplines	  such	  as	  comparative	  politics.	  This	  section	  is	  not	  necessary	  for	  understanding	  the	  rest	  of	  this	  
article,	  but	   it	  may	  be	  helpful	   for	  readers	  wondering	  what,	   if	  anything,	   is	  new	  in	  ECL.	  Section	  3	  surveys	  
the	  main	  applications	  of	  ECL	   to	  date.	  Because	  ECL	   is	   a	  method	   rather	   than	  a	  body	  of	   knowledge,	   this	  
survey’s	  goal	  is	  not	  to	  be	  exhaustive	  but	  merely	  to	  illustrate	  the	  method’s	  use.	  Sections	  4	  and	  5	  form	  the	  
substantive	   core	  of	   this	   article.	   Section	  4	   reviews	   the	  obstacles	   to	   causal	   inference	   from	   comparative	  
data.	   I	   take	   a	   very	   skeptical	   view	   but	   argue	   that	   ECL	   remains	   at	   least	   an	   important	   filter	   for	   causal	  
theories	   and	   complements	   other	   empirical	   tests.	   Section	   5	   discusses	   other	   methodological	   issues	   of	  
particular	   relevance	   for	   ECL	   in	   data	   collection	   (measurement),	   analysis,	   and	   interpretation.	   Section	   6	  
concludes	  this	  review.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  Throughout	  the	  article,	  I	  refer	  to	  the	  collection	  of	  countries	  on	  earth	  as	  a	  sample	  rather	  than	  the	  population.	  In	  
other	  words,	  I	  take	  the	  relevant	  population	  to	  be	  an	  abstractly	  defined	  set	  of	  possible	  countries	  rather	  than	  the	  set	  
of	  presently	  or	  formerly	  existing	  countries	  on	  earth.	  The	  reason	  is	  that	  ECL	  aims	  or	  should	  aim	  to	  test	  theories	  that	  
can	  predict	  what	  will	  happen	  in	  a	  country	  that	  was	  not	  yet	  in	  the	  sample,	  for	  example,	  because	  it	  is	  new	  or	  because	  
it	  implements	  a	  reform.	  
2	  A	  well	  executed	  study	  will	  use	  all	  the	  data	  points	  (countries)	  to	  which	  the	  hypothesis	  under	  investigation	  applies.	  
This	  will	  leave	  no	  other	  countries	  for	  replication.	  (It	  is	  nevertheless	  appropriate	  to	  speak	  of	  “sample,”	  see	  previous	  
note.)	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2.	  	   Relationship	  To	  Other	  Literatures	  
ECL	   is	   closely	   related	   to,	   and	  partially	  overlaps	  with,	   at	   least	   three	   literatures:	   empirical	   legal	   studies,	  
comparative	  politics,	  and	  comparative	  law.	  The	  dividing	  lines	  are	  not	  sharp	  and	  may	  have	  as	  much	  to	  do	  
with	  the	  people	  involved	  as	  with	  the	  questions	  and	  the	  methods.3	  	  
Substantively,	  ECL	  is	  a	  subfield	  of	  empirical	  legal	  studies.	  The	  distinguishing	  feature	  of	  ECL	  is	  the	  use	  of	  
cross-­‐country	   data.	   	   This	   is,	   however,	   not	   a	   fundamental	   distinction.	   For	   example,	   the	   comparison	   of	  
national	   constitutions	   is	   not	   fundamentally	   different	   from	   the	   comparison	  of	   state	   constitutions	   (e.g.,	  
Dixon	  &	  Holden	  2012),	  and	  both	  can	  shed	   light	  on	   the	  same	  questions.	  That	  being	  said,	  cross-­‐country	  
data	   often	   offer	  more	   variation	   then	   subnational	   data.	   Often,	   a	   particular	   question	   is	   decided	   at	   the	  
national	   level,	   such	   that	   the	   only	   available	   variation	   is	   cross	   country.	   The	   greater	   variability	   has	   both	  
advantages	  and	  disadvantages.	  For	  example,	  an	  investigation	  of	  dictatorship	  effects	  would	  benefit	  from	  
comparative	  data	  that	  contains	  dictatorships,	  whereas	  an	   investigation	  of	  details	  of	  democratic	  design	  
against	   the	   backdrop	   of	   US-­‐style	  mass	  media	  may	   be	   better	   served	   by	   a	   comparison	   of	   states.	   As	   a	  
practical	  matter,	   cross-­‐country	  data	   tend	   to	  be	  much	  more	  difficult	   to	  obtain,	   at	   least	   in	   a	   consistent	  
format.	  
Comparative	  politics	  and	  other	  comparative	  social	  sciences	  do	  use	  cross-­‐country	  data,	  and	  many	  of	  the	  
papers	  surveyed	  below	  explicitly	  speak	  and	  may	  even	  belong	  to	  those	  disciplines.	   I	  have	  attempted	  to	  
select	   papers	   that	   produce	   and/or	   use	  more	   and	  better	   comparative	   legal	   data	   than	  has	   traditionally	  
been	   the	   case.	   In	   particular,	   the	   involvement	   of	   lawyers	   in	   ECL	   has	   considerably	   improved	   and	  
broadened	  the	  legal	  data-­‐collection	  process.	  
ECL	  also	  has	  many	  points	  of	  contact	  with	  various	  branches	  of	  the	  heterodox	  field	  of	  comparative	  law.4	  
The	  major	  difference	  is	  that	  comparative	  lawyers	  traditionally	  ask	  different,	  noncausal	  questions	  (Pistor	  
2010).5	  In	   particular,	  most	   comparative	   law	  has	   been	   devoted	   to	   understanding	   foreign	   legal	   systems	  
(e.g.,	  Lasser	  2004),	  developing	  common	  concepts	  (e.g.,	  Michaels	  2006),	  and	  a	  comparative	  mapping	  of	  
legal	  rules	  and	  institutions	  (e.g.,	  Zweigert	  &	  Kötz	  1998).	  Where	  comparative	  lawyers	  have	  tackled	  causal	  
questions,	   as	   in	   the	   exploration	   of	   legal	   change	   (e.g.,	   Glendon	   1989),	   they	   have	   favored	   more	  
exploratory,	   descriptive	   accounts	   over	   an	   explicit	   hypothesis-­‐testing	   framework.6	  In	   spite	   or	   rather	  
because	  of	  these	  differences	  between	  ECL	  and	  comparative	  law,	  the	  opportunities	  for	  fruitful	  exchange	  
are	  plentiful.	  Comparative	  law	  offers	  ECL	  important	  hypotheses,	  concepts,	  and	  knowledge	  of	  legal	  rules	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  Suchman	   &	   Mertz	   (2010)	   document	   a	   similar	   phenomenon	   in	   domestic	   empirical	   work.	   In	   particular,	   they	  
distinguish	  “Empirical	  Legal	  Studies”	  from	  other	  empirical	  approaches.	  For	  brevity,	  I	  use	  the	  term	  “empirical	  legal	  
studies”	  for	  any	  empirical	  work	  with	  legal	  data.	  
4	  On	  the	  heterodoxy	  of	  the	  field,	  see,	  e.g.,	  Reimann	  (2002,	  pt.	  II),	  and	  compare	  the	  number	  of	  approaches	  surveyed	  
in	  Reimann	  &	  Zimmermann	  (2006,	  pt.	  II).	  
5	  The	  dividing	  line	  has	  never	  been	  sharp.	  For	  example,	  Edouard	  Lambert	  (1905)	  speculated	  in	  his	  famous	  report	  for	  
the	   Paris	   Congress	   of	   1900	   that	   comparative	   law	   and	   legal	   sociology	   are	   one	   and	   the	   same	   thing	   (p.	   35),	   with	  
missions	  such	  as	  to	  reveal	  the	  “natural	  laws”	  of	  social	  life	  (p.	  32)	  or	  at	  least	  the	  effect	  of	  legal	  reforms	  in	  various	  
countries	  (p.	  36).	  
6	  Some	  within	  the	  field	  even	  hesitate	  to	  attach	  the	  label	  “empirical”	  to	  comparative	  law,	  although	  comparative	  law	  
is	   by	   definition	   empirical	   in	   the	   sense	   of	   learning	   from	   observation.	   Cf.	   Jansen	   (2006,	   p.	   313)	   (contrasting	  
comparative	  law’s	  attempts	  to	  capture	  similarity	  and	  dissimilarity	  of	  legal	  systems	  to	  “the	  empirical	  sciences”).	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and	  institutions	  and	  their	  functioning	  in	  practice.	  ECL	  in	  turn	  generates	  data	  that	  can	  inform	  taxonomies	  
of	  legal	  systems	  and	  other	  descriptive	  elements	  of	  comparative	  law.7	  In	  separate	  work,	  I	  also	  argue	  that	  
comparative	  law	  would	  benefit	  from	  applying	  ECL’s	  hypothesis	  testing	  framework	  and	  empirical	  rigor	  to	  
traditional	  comparative	  law	  questions	  such	  as	  legal	  families	  or	  traditions	  (Spamann	  2013).	  
Comparative	   lawyers	  have	  often	  been	  quite	  critical	  of	  ECL,	   in	  particular	   the	   law	  and	   finance	   literature	  
surveyed	   in	   Section	   3.2	   (for	   a	   summary	   of	   the	   criticisms,	   see	  Michaels	   2009).	   I	   do	   not	   have	   space	   to	  
address	  these	  criticisms	  explicitly,	  but	  my	  own	  criticisms	  from	  within	  the	  statistical-­‐empirical	  framework	  
nest	   most	   of	   them.	   For	   example,	   I	   interpret	   the	   charges	   of	   neglect	   of	   functionally	   equivalent	  
mechanisms,	   arbitrary	   selection	   and	  weighting	   of	   index	   components,	   and	   neglect	   of	   law	   in	   action	   as	  
problems	  of	  measurement	   validity	   (Section	   5.1)	   or	   low	  prior	   probability	   of	   the	   tested	   theory	   (Section	  
5.3).	  Similarly,	  the	  criticism	  that	  empirical	  work	  has	  paid	  too	  little	  attention	  to	  local	  particularities	  alleges	  	  
a	  problem	  of	  measurement	  or	  a	  problem	  of	  insufficient	  controls	  that	  I	  discuss	  at	  length	  in	  Sections	  4.1	  
and	  5.2.	  
3.	  	   Examples	  
In	  this	  section,	  I	  review	  some	  particularly	  active	  areas	  of	  ECL.	  I	  make	  no	  attempt	  to	  be	  comprehensive.	  
This	  would	  be	  pointless	  for	  a	  “field”	  identified	  by	  a	  method	  rather	  than	  an	  object	  of	  study,	  and	  it	  would	  
be	   hopeless	   given	   the	   volume	   of	   literature.8 	  Rather,	   my	   goal	   is	   to	   illustrate	   the	   broad	   range	   of	  
applications	   of	   ECL.	   For	   these	   merely	   illustrative	   purposes,	   I	   refrain	   from	   reporting	   statistical	   and	  
economic	   magnitudes.	   I	   defer	   methodological	   discussions	   of	   measurement	   and	   interpretation	   to	  
subsequent	  sections.	  
3.1.	   Constitutional	  Law	  
There	   is	   a	   rich	   comparative	   empirical	   literature	   on	   constitutions	   in	   comparative	   politics	   and	   political	  
economy	   (e.g.,	  Ben-­‐Bassat	  &	  Dahan	  2008;	   for	  a	   survey,	   see,	  e.g.,	   Landmann	  &	  Robinson	  2009).	   In	   the	  
past	  decade,	  however,	  this	  research	  has	  received	  a	  major	  boost	  through	  the	  Comparative	  Constitutions	  
Project	  (CCP)	  directed	  by	  political	  scientists	  Zachary	  Elkins	  and	  James	  Melton	  and	  lawyer	  Tom	  Ginsburg	  
(comparativeconstitutionsproject.org).	  The	  CCP	  is	  a	  publicly	  available	  cross-­‐national	  historical	  data	  set	  of	  
all	  written	  constitutions	  from	  1789	  through	  the	  present.	  It	  codes	  668	  constitutional	  characteristics	  and	  
tracks	  their	  development	  over	  time,	  including	  adoption,	  amendments,	  and	  suspensions.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7	  For	  example,	  Siems	  (2015)	  performs	  a	  cluster	  analysis	  of	  the	  Doing	  Business	  investor	  protection	  data	  and	  finds	  no	  
confirmation	  for	  standard	  taxonomies.	  	  Such	  work	  still	  remains	  too	  rare,	  even	  though	  the	  situation	  has	  improved	  
since	   Reimann	   (2002,	   p.	   686)	   wrote	   “[C]omparative	   law	   has	   still	   not	   acquired	   a	   solid	   empirical	   basis.	  We	   have	  
ridiculously	   little	  statistical	  data	  about	  the	   legal	  systems	  we	  study	  and	  compare.	  Without	  such	  data,	  most	  of	  our	  
conclusions	   rest	   on	   personal	   intuition,	   anecdotal	   information,	   or	   plain	   speculation,	   rather	   than	   on	   systematic	  
observation	  of	  hard	  facts.”	  See	  Siems	  (2014)	  for	  a	  textbook-­‐length	  attempt	  to	  integrate	  “numerical”	  findings	  into	  
comparative	  law.	  
8	  For	   example,	   Carrubba	   et	   al.	   (2012)	   count	   154	   articles	   just	   in	   comparative	   judicial	   politics	   from	   1990-­‐-­‐2009.	  
Isolated	   examples	   of	   empirical	   comparative	   law	   can	   be	   found	   as	   far	   back	   as	   the	   1960s	   (e.g.,	   Schwartz	  &	  Miller	  
1964),	  and	  almost	  certainly	  before.	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CCP	   data	   have	   already	   been	   used	   extensively	   in	   both	   causal	   and	   descriptive	   studies.	   Much	   research	  
focuses	  on	  constitution-­‐making.	  Ginsburg	  et	  al.	  (2009a)	  found	  that	  constitution-­‐making	  processes	  (such	  
as	   the	   involvement	   of	   a	   constitutional	   assembly	   or	   the	   requirement	   of	   ratification	   by	   referendum)	  
correlate	  with	  constitutional	  features	  such	  as	  the	  number	  of	  constitutionally	  guaranteed	  rights.	  Ginsburg	  
et	   al.	   (2009b)	   documented	   that	   constitutions	   last	   on	   average	   only	   19	   years,	   but	   that	   those	   that	   are	  
flexible	   last	   longer	  (cf.	  Dixon	  &	  Ginsburg	  2011).	  Ginsburg	  (2010)	  demonstrated	  that	  constitutions	  have	  
been	  growing	  in	  length,	  scope,	  and	  detail.	  Elkins	  et	  al.	  (2008)	  showed	  that	  constitutions	  adopted	  during	  
occupation	  display	  surprisingly	  little	  resemblance	  to	  the	  occupying	  power’s	  constitution,	  yet	  they	  rarely	  
survive	  for	  long.	  Other	  research	  examines	  subsequent	  outcomes.	  Elkins	  &	  Sides	  (2007)	  documented	  that	  
ethnic	   divisions	   tend	   to	   be	   higher	   in	   countries	   with	   federalism	   and	   proportional	   electoral	   systems.	  	  
Ginsburg	  &	  Garoupa	  (2009)	  demonstrated	  that	  there	  is	  little	  relationship	  between	  judicial	  council	  design	  
and	   judicial	   quality.	   Ginsburg	   et	   al.	   (2011)	   observed	   that	   executive	   term	   limits	   are	   overwhelmingly	  
observed	   in	   established	  democracies.	   CCP	  data	   allow	  quantification	  of	   important	   phenomena	   such	   as	  
the	  correlation	  of	  human	  rights	  on	  the	  books	  and	  in	  action	  (Law	  &	  Versteeg	  2013),	  and	  they	  shed	  doubt	  
on	   what	   used	   to	   be	   considered	   foundational	   distinctions,	   such	   as	   those	   between	   parliamentary	   and	  
presidential	   democracies	   (Cheibub	   et	   al.	   2013).	   They	   have	   also	   inspired	   a	   book	   on	   comparative	  
constitutional	  design	  (Ginsburg	  2012).	  
Other	   data	   remain	   in	   use.	   For	   example,	   Shulztiner	   &	   Carmi	   (2014)	   documented	   the	   rise	   of	   “dignity”	  
(which	  the	  CCP	  also	  records)	  with	  data	  collected	  directly	  from	  the	  constitutions	  of	  all	  193	  UN	  member	  
states.	   They	   showed	   both	   qualitatively	   and	   quantitatively	   that	   “dignity”	   is	   not	   necessarily	   associated	  
with	   liberal	   practices	   and	  may	   even	   be	   invoked	   for	   illiberal	   purposes.	   Dreher	   et	   al.	   (2010)	   used	   data	  
combining	   human	   rights	   on	   the	   books	   and	   in	   action	   from	   the	   CIRI	   Human	   Rights	   Data	   Project	  
(humanrightsdata.com)	   to	   show	   that	   terrorism	   tends	   to	   be	   followed	   by	   a	   significant	   decrease	   in	   the	  
respect	  for	  human	  rights.	  Using	  data	  derived	  from	  the	  US	  State	  Department	  and	  Amnesty	  International	  
reports,	   Goderis	   &	   Versteeg	   (2012)	   showed	   that	   such	   decreases	   are	   smaller	   in	   countries	   with	  
independent	  judicial	  review	  (as	  measured	  by	  La	  Porta	  et	  al.	  2004).	  
3.2.	  	   Law	  and	  Finance,	  Doing	  Business,	  and	  Legal	  Origins	  
Perhaps	   the	   largest	   literature	   in	   ECL	   to	   date	   is	   known	   as	   law	   and	   finance.	   In	   the	   eponymous	   paper,	  
financial	   economists	   La	   Porta,	   Lopez-­‐de-­‐Silanes,	   Shleifer,	   and	  Vishny	   (La	  Porta	   et	   al.	   1998)	   introduced	  
additive	   indicators	   of	   certain	   shareholder	   and	   creditor	   protection	   rules	   in	   49	   countries,	   respectively	  
known	  as	  the	  antidirector	  rights	  index	  and	  the	  creditor	  rights	  index.	  They	  showed	  that	  the	  antidirector	  
rights	   index	   positively	   correlated	   with	   equity	   market	   outcomes	   such	   as	   market	   capitalization	   and	  
ownership	   dispersion	   (La	   Porta	   et	   al.	   1997;	   1998;	   1999;	   2000;	   2002a,b).	   Some	   of	   these	   early	   results	  
subsequently	   yielded	   to	   better	   data	   (Holderness	   forthcoming,	   Spamann	   2010c).	   But	   newer,	   more	  
refined	  studies	  on	  even	  larger	  samples	  have	  upheld,	  refined,	  and	  added	  other	  results	  with	  new	  indices	  
of	  public	  and	  private	  securities	  laws	  (La	  Porta	  et	  al.	  2006),	  rules	  against	  managerial	  self-­‐dealing	  (Djankov	  
et	  al.	  2008b),	  duration	  of	  and	  recovery	  in	  bankruptcy	  (Djankov	  et	  al.	  2008a),	  and	  a	  revised	  creditor	  rights	  
index	   (Djankov	   et	   al.	   2007).	   A	   voluminous	   follow-­‐up	   literature	   has	   documented	   correlations	   of	   these	  
measures	  with	   various	   financial	  market	   outcomes,	   developed	   supporting	   theory,	   and	   tested	   corollary	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hypotheses	   on	   comparative	   and	   domestic	   data.	   In	   a	   recent	   survey,	   La	   Porta	   et	   al.	   (2013,	   p.	   450)	  
concluded	  that	  this	  literature	  had	  established	  that	  “better	  [legal]	  investor	  protection…is	  associated	  with	  
improved	   financial	   development,	   better	   access	   to	   finance,	   and	   higher	   ownership	   dispersion.”	   Several	  
empirical	  studies,	  however,	  dispute	  this	  claim	  (e.g.,	  Armour	  et	  al.	  2009b,	  Cheffins	  et	  al.	  2013,	  Holderness	  
forthcoming)	   as	   well	   as	   the	   regularity	   assumptions	   embedded	   in	   the	   quantitative	   methods	   used	   to	  
support	  it	  (e.g.,	  Milhaupt	  &	  Pistor	  2008,	  Pistor	  2013).	  
The	  main	  authors	  of	  law	  and	  finance	  soon	  exported	  their	  approach	  to	  other	  areas	  of	  law.	  They	  showed	  
that,	   as	   measured	   by	   the	   legal	   indices	   they	   specifically	   designed	   and	   collected	   for	   these	   studies,	  
procedural	   formalism	   “is	   associated	   with	   higher	   expected	   duration	   of	   judicial	   proceedings,	   less	  
consistency,	  less	  honesty,	   less	  fairness	  in	  judicial	  decisions,	  and	  more	  corruption”	  (Djankov	  et	  al.	  2003,	  
p.	  453);	  “judicial	  independence	  and	  constitutional	  review	  are	  associated	  with	  greater	  freedom”	  (La	  Porta	  
et	   al.	   2004,	   p.	   445);	   “[c]ountries	   with	   heavier	   regulation	   of	   entry	   have	   higher	   corruption	   and	   larger	  
unofficial	   economies,	   but	   not	   better	   quality	   of	   public	   or	   private	   goods”	   (Djankov	   et	   al.	   2002,	   p.	   1);	  
“[h]eavier	   regulation	   of	   labor	   is	   associated	   with	   lower	   labor	   force	   participation	   and	   higher	  
unemployment,	   especially	   of	   the	   young”	   (Botero	   et	   al.	   2004,	   p.	   1339);	   and	   “[p]ublic	   disclosure	   [of	  
politicians’	  financial	  and	  other	  conflicts],	  but	  not	  internal	  disclosure	  to	  parliament,	  is	  positively	  related	  to	  
government	   quality,	   including	   lower	   corruption”	   (Djankov	   et	   al.	   2010,	   p.	   179).	   A	   general	   and	  
controversial	   theme	  of	   this	   literature	   is	   that,	   as	  measured	  by	   these	   studies,	   “interventionist”	  policies,	  
such	  as	  government	  ownership	  of	  banks	  (Barth	  et	  al.	  2006,9	  La	  Porta	  et	  al.	  2002a),	  correlate	  with	  worse	  
outcomes	  such	  as	  corruption.	  
The	  World	  Bank	  financed	  these	  and	  the	  later	  law	  and	  finance	  studies	  and	  used	  them	  as	  foundation	  for	  
its	  Doing	  Business	  project	  (doingbusiness.org)	  (World	  Bank	  2014).	  Since	  2004,	  Doing	  Business	  has	  been	  
collecting	  annual	  legal	  data	  in	  10	  or	  11	  areas	  of	  business	  law	  and	  regulation:	  starting	  a	  business,	  dealing	  
with	  construction	  permits,	  getting	  electricity,	  registering	  property,	  paying	  taxes,	  trading	  across	  borders,	  
getting	  credit,	  protecting	  minority	  investors,	  enforcing	  contracts,	  resolving	  insolvency,	  and	  labor	  market	  
regulation.	   The	   standard	   template	   is	   to	   collect	  data	  on	   the	   cost,	  duration,	   and	  number	  of	  procedures	  
involved	  in	  a	  paradigmatic	  case;	  some	  indicators	  instead	  code	  the	  presence	  of	  particular	  legal	  provisions.	  
A	  dedicated	  team	  at	  the	  World	  Bank	  draws	  on	  a	  large	  network	  of	  respondent	  lawyers	  and	  other	  experts	  
around	   the	   world	   to	   collect,	   verify,	   and	   improve	   its	   data.	   Over	   time,	   the	   World	   Bank	   has	   gradually	  
refined	   its	  methodology	   and	  weeded	  out	  mistakes.	  As	   a	   result,	   some	  key	   results	   had	   to	  be	   corrected	  
(e.g.,	   Spamann	   2010b).	   The	   method	   and	   the	   perceived	   neoliberal	   bias	   of	   Doing	   Business	   have	   been	  
extremely	  controversial	   (cf.	  Manuel	  et	  al.	  2013).	  Used	  with	  care,	  however,	  Doing	  Business	  and	  related	  
indicators	  such	  as	  the	  Rule	  of	  Law	  Index	  from	  worldjusticeproject.org	  are	  extremely	  valuable	  pieces	  of	  
information	  for	  empirical	  comparative	  research	  (cf.	  Davis	  2014)	  (Section	  5.1,	  below).	  
Law	  and	  finance	  and	   its	  progeny	  were	  successful	   in	  economics	  and	  finance	  and	  controversial	   in	   law	   in	  
large	  part	  because	  of	  their	  solution	  to	  the	  endogeneity	  problem:	  Does	  the	  law	  on	  the	  books	  cause	  the	  
observed	  social	  phenomenon	  (e.g.,	  financial	  market	  size),	  or	  is	  it	  the	  converse	  (see	  generally	  Section	  4)?	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9	  Barth	   et	   al.	   (2013)	   present	   an	   expanded	   and	   updated	   version	   of	   the	   underlying	   data	   on	   bank	   regulation	   and	  
supervision	  in	  180	  countries	  from	  1999	  to	  2011.	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La	   Porta	   et	   al.	   (1998)	   observed	   that	   their	   indices	   of	   investor	   protection	  were	  on	   average	   significantly	  
higher	   in	   common	   law	   than	   in	   civil	   law	   systems.	   Arguing	   that	   membership	   in	   a	   legal	   family	   (“legal	  
origin”)	  was	  determined	  long	  before	  contemporary	  market	  outcomes	  and	  plausibly	   influences	   investor	  
protection	  laws,	  La	  Porta	  et	  al.	  (1998)	  concluded	  that	  causation	  must	  run	  from	  the	  laws	  to	  the	  market	  
outcomes.	  All	  the	  other	  studies	  cited	  above	  found	  the	  same	  correlation	  between	  common	  law	  and	  more	  
“market-­‐friendly”	   regulation,	   even	   including	   a	   lower	   likelihood	  of	   using	   the	   draft	   (Mulligan	  &	   Shleifer	  
2005).	  This	  raised	  the	  question	  why	  the	  common	  law	  countries	  were	  more	  market	  friendly	  on	  average.	  
Drawing	   on	   Merryman	   (1969)	   and	   other	   legal	   comparatists,	   Glaeser	   &	   Shleifer	   (2002)	   and	   others	  
conjectured	  that	  the	  answer	  was	  to	  be	  found	  in	  the	  civil	  law’s	  ostensible	  preference	  for	  statutes	  and	  less	  
independent	  judges.	  
This	   conjecture	  drew	  a	  number	  of	   responses.	   First,	   the	   correlation	  between	   legal	  origins,	   laws	  on	   the	  
books,	  and	  outcomes	  may	  be	  confounded	  by	  other	  factors.	  Even	  though	  the	  country-­‐level	  data	  ruled	  out	  
many	  factors	  (e.g.,	  religion)	  (La	  Porta	  et	  al.	  2008),	  it	  could	  not	  address	  others.	  In	  particular,	  Klerman	  et	  
al.	   (2011)	  pointed	  out	   that	   legal	  origin	   is	   almost	  perfectly	   correlated	  with	   colonial	  origin,	  which	   could	  
have	   influenced	   subsequent	   developments	   through	   various	   other	   channels.10	  Bubb	   (2013)	   validated	  
such	   concerns	   by	   zooming	   in	   to	   the	   local	   level.	   He	   showed	   that	   de	   facto	   property	   rights	   differ	   little	  
between	   either	   side	   of	   the	   border	   separating	   Ghana	   and	   Côte	   d’Ivoire,	   whereas	   other	   economic	  
outcomes	   do.	   Michalopoulos	   &	   Papaioannou	   (2014)	   investigated	   similar	   phenomena	   across	   Africa.	  
Second,	   even	   if	   laws	   at	   the	   country	   level	   were	   responsible	   for	   the	   diverging	   outcomes,	   intrinsic	  
differences	  between	  common	  and	  civil	   law	  would	  not	  be	   the	  only	  plausible	  explanation.	   In	  particular,	  
Spamann	   (2010a)	   showed	   that	  peripheral	   countries	   continue	   to	   copy	   legal	  materials	   from	   their	   origin	  
countries,	   such	   that	   random	   variation	   in	   the	   origin	   countries	   England	   and	   France	   unrelated	   to	   the	  
common/civil	   law	  distinction	  could	  generate	  the	  observed	  pattern.	  Third,	  and	  crucially,	  there	  was	  little	  
direct	   evidence	   for	   the	   claim	   that	   differences	   in	   the	   role	   of	   case	   law	   (or	   for	   that	   matter	   any	   other	  
phenomena	   traditionally	   linked	   to	   legal	  origins)	  explained	   the	  cross-­‐country	  pattern	  of	   regulation.	   For	  
example,	  Roe	   (2006)	  pointed	  out	   that	   the	   legal	   rules	   in	  question	  were	  overwhelmingly	  statutory	   in	  all	  
jurisdictions,	  not	   just	   the	  civil	   law	  countries,	  whereas	  Jackson	  &	  Roe	  (2009)	  showed	  that	  common	   law	  
countries	  spent	  more	  money	  on	  public	  enforcement	  of	  securities	  laws.	  Similarly,	  in	  civil	  procedure-­‐-­‐-­‐the	  
one	  area	  where	  most	  modern	  comparative	  lawyers	  still	  see	  pronounced	  differences	  between	  common	  
and	  civil	  law	  (Michaels	  2009,	  p.	  781)-­‐-­‐-­‐corrected	  data	  showed	  no	  performance	  differences	  between	  the	  
two	  legal	  families	  (Spamann	  2010b).	  Finally,	  Klerman	  &	  Mahoney	  (2007)	  and	  Roe	  (2007)	  undermined	  the	  
historical	  narrative	  in	  Glaeser	  &	  Shleifer	  (2002).	  
In	  response,	  La	  Porta	  et	  al.	  (2008,	  pp.	  286,	  308;	  2013,	  pp.	  427,	  457)	  adopted	  a	  generic	  characterization	  
of	   legal	   families	   as	   “style[s]	   of	   social	   control	   of	   economic	   life	   (and	  maybe	   of	   other	   aspects	   of	   life	   as	  
well),”	  where	  “common	  law	  stands	  for	  the	  strategy	  of	  social	  control	  that	  seeks	  to	  support	  private	  market	  
outcomes,	   whereas	   civil	   law	   seeks	   to	   replace	   such	   outcomes	   with	   state-­‐desired	   allocations.”	   More	  
specifically,	   they	  conjectured	   that	  common	  and	  civil	   law	  differ	   in	   their	   “toolkits”	  or	   the	  “beliefs	  about	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10	  Oto-­‐Peralías	  &	  Romero-­‐Avila	  (2014)	  argue	  that	  legal	  and	  colonial	  origin	  interacted,	  in	  particular	  because	  England	  
pursued	  a	  strategy	  of	  “indirect	  rule”	  in	  thickly	  settled	  or	  otherwise	  hostile	  territories.	  
	  
	   7	  
how	  the	  law	  should	  deal	  with	  social	  problems…incorporated	  in	  legal	  rules,	  institutions,	  and	  education.”	  
This	   conjecture	   awaits	   refinement	   into	   hypotheses	   that	   are	   both	   falsifiable	   and	   not	   obviously	   false.	  
Which	  tools	  are	  supposed	  to	  be	  lacking	  in	  either	  family,	  and	  which	  aspects	  of	  the	  law	  are	  supposed	  to	  
incorporate	  these	  beliefs	  in	  such	  durable	  fashion,	  and	  how?	  In	  particular,	  even	  proponents	  of	  legal	  origin	  
differences	  affirm	  that	  civil	  law	  systems	  do	  not	  lack	  the	  “tool”	  of	  judicial	  precedent,	  i.e.,	  case	  law	  (e.g.,	  
Merryman	  1969,	  pp.	  48-­‐-­‐49).	  
3.3.	   Diffusion	  and	  Legal	  Transplants	  
Another	  active	  area	  of	  research	  has	  dealt	  explicitly	  with	  the	  extent	  to	  which,	  and	  the	  reasons	  why,	  law	  
“diffuses”	   from	   one	   country	   to	   another.11	  One	   aspect	   of	   diffusion	   is	   the	   reception	   of	   formal	   legal	  
materials	  from	  another	  jurisdiction,	  an	  idea	  popularized	  as	  “legal	  transplants”	  by	  Watson	  (1974).	  Formal	  
materials	  include	  statutes,	  precedents,	  and	  treatises.	  Spamann	  (2010a)	  showed	  that	  periphery	  countries	  
continued	  to	  import	  such	  materials	  from	  core	  countries	  in	  the	  same	  legal	  family	  through	  the	  second	  half	  
of	  the	  twentieth	  century.	   In	  a	  study	  of	  ten	  European	  high	  courts,	  Gelter	  &	  Siems	  (2014)	  showed,	   inter	  
alia,	  that	  their	  citations	  to	  one	  another	  cluster	  within	  legal	  families	  as	  well.	  
Detecting	   outside	   influence	   is	   much	   harder	   when	   it	   does	   not	   involve	   literal	   copying	   or	   explicit	  
references.	   In	   these	   cases,	   ECL	   can	   infer	   diffusion	   only	   from	   the	   timing	   of	   reforms	   (but	   see	   note	   17	  
below).	  In	  this	  spirit,	  Goderis	  &	  Versteeg	  (2015)	  showed	  that	  constitutional	  rights	  in	  180	  countries	  after	  
World	  War	  II	  tend	  to	  track	  other	  countries	  with	  the	  same	  legal	  origin,	  particularly	  the	  former	  colonizer,	  
but	  also	  countries	  with	  the	  same	  religion	  or	  aid	  donor.	  By	  contrast,	  Ginsburg	  &	  Versteeg	  (2014)	  found	  no	  
such	   pattern	   for	   the	   adoption	   of	   constitutional	   review,	   which	   correlates	   only	   with	   domestic	   political	  
developments.	   There	   is	   a	   large	   literature	   on	   similar	   questions	   in	   political	   science.	   For	   example,	   Linos	  
(2013)	  examined	  “how	  health,	  family,	  and	  employment	  laws	  spread	  across	  countries,”	  emphasizing	  the	  
mechanism	  of	  foreign	  role	  models	  in	  democratic	  discourse.	  
Inversely,	   even	   literal	   copying	   need	   not	   imply	   substantive	   convergence.	   For	   example,	   Greenhill	   et	   al.	  
(2009)	  found	  that,	  although	  formal	   labor	   laws	   in	  90	  developing	  countries	  tended	  to	  resemble	  those	  of	  
their	  main	  export	  destinations	  in	  the	  years	  1986-­‐-­‐2002,	  their	  labor	  practices	  did	  not.	  In	  general,	  recipient	  
systems	  seem	  to	  be	  less	  “functional”	  as	  measured	  by	  rates	  of	  change	  and	  flexibility	  of	  corporate	  law	  in	  
10	  countries	  (Pistor	  et	  al.	  2003)	  and	  measures	  of	  effective	  legal	  institutions	  (e.g.,	  absence	  of	  corruption)	  
in	  49	  countries	  (Berkowitz	  et	  al.	  2003a,b),	  at	   least	  where	  the	   local	  population	  had	  no	  prior	  experience	  
with	  the	  foreign	  law.	  
3.4.	  	  Other	  Examples	  
There	   are	   many	   more	   examples	   in	   virtually	   all	   areas	   of	   law.	   Most	   studies	   examine	   cross-­‐sectional	  
correlations,	  i.e.,	  correlations	  of	  two	  or	  usually	  more	  features	  across	  countries	  at	  a	  given	  point	  in	  time.	  
For	  reasons	  discussed	  in	  Section	  4.2,	  however,	  some	  studies	  examine	  the	  correlation	  of	  changes	  across	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11	  There	  is	  also	  research	  on	  the	  more	  basic	  question	  whether	  (written)	  law	  in	  different	  countries	  is	  converging	  (e.g.,	  
Armour	  et	  al.	  2009a,	  2009b;	  Gahan	  et	  al.	  2012).	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time	  and	  space	  (as	  in	  the	  diffusion	  studies	  mentioned	  in	  the	  previous	  subsection).	  For	  example,	  Armour	  
&	  Cumming	  (2008)	  showed	  that	  changes	  toward	  more	  “forgiving”	  bankruptcy	  laws	  tend	  to	  be	  followed	  
by	   increases	   in	   self-­‐employment	   (“entrepreneurship”)	   in	   15	   Western	   countries	   from	   1990	   to	   2005.	  
Calderón	  &	   Chong	   (2009)	   showed	   that	   increases	   in	   labor	   regulation	   are	   associated	  with	   decreases	   in	  
income	  inequality	  in	  a	  large	  sample	  of	  countries	  from	  1970	  to	  2000.	  Gonzalez	  &	  Viitanen	  (2009)	  showed	  
that	  the	  introduction	  of	  no-­‐fault	  or	  unilateral	  divorce	  is	  associated	  with	  an	  increase	  in	  the	  divorce	  rate	  in	  
European	  countries	  in	  the	  second	  half	  of	  the	  twentieth	  century.	  Klick	  et	  al.	  (2012)	  showed	  that	  abortion	  
liberalization	   is	   associated	  with	   changes	   in	   sexual	   behavior	   (as	   proxied	   by	   gonorrhea	   incidence)	   in	   41	  
countries	  from	  1980	  to	  2000.	  This	  list	  could	  easily	  be	  extended	  (e.g.,	  on	  patent	  law	  and	  innovation,	  see	  
Moser	  2005,	  Lerner	  2009;	  on	  creditor	  rights	  and	  lending,	  see	  Haselmann	  et	  al.	  2010).	  
4.	  	   Causation:	  The	  Identification	  Problem	  
In	   the	   previous	   section,	   I	   reported	   the	   results	   of	   the	   surveyed	   studies	   as	  mere	   correlations	   within	   a	  
sample.	   The	   real	   interest	   for	   policy	   makers	   and	   most	   authors,	   however,	   is	   to	   what	   extent	   these	  
correlations	  provide	  evidence	  for	  a	  causal	  link	  between	  the	  phenomena	  under	  study.	  I	  argue	  here	  that	  
comparative	  evidence	  alone	  will	  hardly	  ever	  be	  sufficient	  to	  establish	  a	  causal	  claim	  and	  that	  statistical	  
methods	   that	  purport	   to	  do	  so	  are	   likely	   to	  do	  more	  harm	  than	  good	   in	  comparative	   settings.	  Even	   if	  
comparative	   data	   cannot	   identify	   any	   single	   causal	   theory,	   however,	   they	   are	   extremely	   important	   in	  
narrowing	  down	  the	  set	  of	  plausible	  theories.	  A	  thoughtful	  pursuit	  of	  this	  more	  modest	  agenda	  seems	  to	  
me	  the	  most	  fruitful	  avenue	  for	  ECL.	  
4.1.	  	  The	  Idea	  of	  Causal	  Inference	  
The	  basic	  idea	  of	  inferring	  causation	  from	  comparative	  data	  is	  a	  ceteris	  paribus	  argument.	  If	  countries	  A	  
and	  B	  are	  alike	  in	  all	  relevant	  respects	  except	  X	  and	  Y,	  and	  X	  precedes	  Y,	  then	  any	  difference	  in	  Y	  must	  be	  
caused	  by	  the	  difference	  in	  X.12	  The	  large	  variation	  of	  interesting	  attributes	  across	  countries	  presents	  a	  
distinct	   advantage	   for	   such	   an	   argument,	   in	   that	   many	   attributes	   such	   as	   judicial	   review	   differ	   only	  
across,	  but	  not	  within,	   countries.	  Unfortunately,	   this	   large	  variation	   is	  also	  comparative	  data’s	  biggest	  
disadvantage:	  There	  are	  never	  two	  countries	  that	  differ	  only	  in	  the	  attributes	  (X,Y)	  of	  interest.	  How	  then	  
can	  comparative	  work	  identify	  the	  effect	  of	  the	  factor	  of	  interest	  (X)	  from	  among	  all	  others	  (X',	  X'',	  etc.),	  
if	  at	  all?	  
Qualitative	   and	   quantitative	   studies	   pursue	   fundamentally	   different	   answers	   to	   this	   question.	  
Qualitative	  studies	  examine	  the	  countries	  in	  question	  in	  depth	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  rule	  out	  that	  there	  were	  
meaningful	   differences	   on	   other	   possibly	   relevant	   characteristics	   X',	   X'',	   etc.,	   or	   at	   least	   that	   these	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12	  However,	  one	  could	  (and	  should!)	  ask	  how	  the	  difference	  in	  X	  arises.	  I	  hope	  that	  one	  can	  temporarily	  suppress	  
this	   question	   for	  purposes	  of	   this	   thought	   experiment.	   In	   any	   real	   case,	   the	  origin	  of	  X	   is	   indeed	  a	  major	   issue,	  
because	  whatever	  caused	  X	  may	  also	  have	  caused	  Y	  directly	  (cf.	  the	  discussion	  in	  the	  subsequent	  paragraphs	  of	  the	  
main	  text).	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differences	   had	   a	   confounding	   effect	   in	   these	   particular	   countries.13	  By	   contrast,	   quantitative	   work	  
remains	  agnostic	  on	  the	  causes	  of	  outcome	  Y	   in	  any	  individual	  country	  and	  focuses	  instead	  on	  average	  
effects	  of	  X	   in	  groups	  of	   countries.	  The	  basic	  argument	   is	   familiar	   from	  randomized	  control	   trials,	   i.e.,	  
true	   experiments.	   For	   example,	   in	   a	   drug	   trial,	   it	   is	   accepted	   and	   in	   fact	   assumed	   that	   one	   cannot	  
ascertain	  how	  much,	  if	  at	  all,	  the	  drug	  changed	  the	  health	  outcome	  for	  any	  individual	  patient	  (or	  would	  
have	  changed	  it,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  a	  person	  receiving	  the	  placebo).	  Rather,	  one	  infers	  the	  average	  effect	  of	  
the	  drug	   from	  the	  difference	   in	  average	  health	  outcomes	  between	   the	   treatment	  and	  control	  groups.	  
This	  works	  because	  randomizing	  who	  receives	  the	  drug	  (or,	  generically,	  the	  treatment)	  makes	  the	  two	  
groups	   identical	   in	   all	   other	   respects	   in	   expectation,	   and	   the	   probability	   of	   deviations	   from	   this	  
expectation	  above	  a	  certain	  size	  can	  be	  estimated	  from	  the	  dispersion	  of	  individual	  outcomes	  (Holland	  
1986).	  
Social	   scientists	   generally	   cannot	  manipulate	   their	   study	   contexts	  and	   randomly	  assign	  a	   “treatment.”	  
Modern	  empirical	  social	  science	  increasingly	  attempts	  to	  approximate	  the	  experimental	  ideal,	  however,	  
by	  exploiting	  natural	  or	  quasi	  experiments,	  i.e.,	  settings	  where	  the	  key	  independent	  variable	  of	  interest	  
(i.e.,	   the	   candidate	   cause)	   is	   plausibly	   as	   good	   as	   randomly	   assigned	   (Angrist	   &	   Pischke	   2009,	   2014;	  
Dunning	   2012;	   Ho	   &	   Rubin	   2011;	   Imbens	   &	   Rubin	   2015).	   Paradigmatic	   research	   exploits	   lotteries	   or	  
sharp	  discontinuities	  at	  cutoff	  values	  of	  nonmanipulable	  continuous	  variables.	  For	  example,	  researchers	  
have	   estimated	   the	   effect	   of	   neighborhood	   quality	   on	   personal	   outcomes	   by	   comparing	  winners	   and	  
losers	  in	  a	  housing	  lottery	  (nber.org/mtopublic/)	  and	  the	  effect	  of	  elite	  schools	  on	  personal	  outcomes	  by	  
comparing	  students	  just	  above	  and	  below	  the	  standardized	  test	  score	  required	  for	  admission	  (Dobbie	  &	  
Fryer	  2014).	  
Views	   differ	   on	   the	   availability	   of	   natural	   experiments	   in	   comparative	   settings.	   In	   my	   experience,	  
outsiders	  to	  ECL	  tend	  to	  be	  very	  skeptical,	  whereas	  insiders	  are	  unsurprisingly	  more	  upbeat.14	  All	  agree,	  
however,	   that	   comparative	  natural	  experiments	  are	   rare.	  Most	   research	   therefore	  pursues	  a	  different	  
strategy.	  I	  describe	  and	  assess	  that	  strategy	  first	  before	  returning	  to	  natural	  experiments.	  
4.2.	  	   Controlling	  
As	   in	  epidemiology	  and	  other	  nonexperimental	   (i.e.,	  observational)	   fields,	   the	   standard	  way	   to	   isolate	  
the	  factor	  of	  interest	  in	  ECL	  is	  to	  “control”	  for	  possible	  confounding	  factors.	  For	  example,	  the	  estimation	  
of	  an	  effect	  of	  shareholder	  protection	  on	  equity	  market	  capitalization	  may	  allow	  for	  the	  possibility	  that	  
the	   latter	   is	   also	   influenced	   by	   the	   country’s	   majority	   religion	   or	   the	   country’s	   size.	   This	   is	   also	  
sometimes	  described	  as	  “holding	  constant”	  the	  confounding	  factors	  (e.g.,	  religion,	  size).	  This	  description	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13	  Cf.,	  e.g.,	  King	  et	  al.	   (2001),	  Hirschl	  (2006),	  and	  Slater	  &	  Ziblatt	  (2013).	  The	  details,	   including	  the	  relationship	  to	  	  
quantitative	  work,	  have	  been	  the	  subject	  of	  considerable	  controversy	  in	  political	  science;	  see,	  e.g.,	  Geddes	  (2003),	  
Brady	  &	  Collier	  (2004),	  Sekhon	  (2004),	  and	  Mahoney	  &	  Goertz	  (2006).	  
14	  Tellingly,	  political	  scientists	  and	  statisticians	  writing	  introductions	  to	  causal	  inference	  for	  lawyers	  do	  not	  mention	  
comparative	   evidence.	   The	   only	   trace	   of	   comparative	  materials	   in	   Ho	  &	   Rubin	   (2011)	   is	   a	   cite	   to	   Bubb	   (2013).	  
Epstein	  &	  King	   (2002,	  p.	  103)	  mention	  cross-­‐country	   research	  once,	   concluding	  a	   long	   list	  of	  possible	   sources	  of	  
evidence	  with	  “even	  cross-­‐country”	  (emphasis	  added).	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evokes	  the	  idea	  that	  the	  technique	  is	  supposed	  to	  create	  and	  then	  to	  compare	  observations	  that	  differ	  
only	  in	  the	  factors	  of	  interest	  (e.g.,	  shareholder	  protection),	  at	  least	  in	  expectation.	  
This	   idea	   is	   easiest	   to	   understand	   in	   an	   approach	   called	  matching.	   First,	   each	   treated	   observation	   is	  
matched	  to	  an	  untreated	  observation	  that	  is	   identical	   in	  terms	  of	  the	  pretreatment	  (control)	  variables,	  
or	   at	   least	   sufficiently	   close	   in	   some	   technical	   sense.	   The	   treatment	   effect	   is	   then	   estimated	   as	   the	  
average	   difference	   in	   outcomes	   between	   the	   treated	   and	   their	   respective	   matched	   untreated	  
observations.	   For	   example,	   one	   could	   find	   for	   each	   country	   with	   good	   shareholder	   protection	   a	  
matching	   country	   of	   the	   same	   religion	   and	   similar	   size	   with	   bad	   shareholder	   protection	   (countries	  
without	  a	  match	  are	  omitted).	  Without	  assuming	  anything	  about	  the	  interaction	  of	  religion	  and	  country	  
size,	  one	  could	  then	  estimate	  the	  effect	  of	  shareholder	  protection	  on	  equity	  market	  size	  by	  calculating	  
the	  average	  difference	  in	  equity	  market	  size	  between	  the	  matched	  countries.	  This	  will	  identify	  the	  causal	  
effect	  of	  shareholder	  protection,	  but	  only	   if	   the	  matching	  variables	   (here,	   religion	  and	  size)	   include	  all	  
confounding	   variables,	   which	   presupposes	   in	   particular	   that	   all	   confounders	   are	   observable.	   In	   any	  
event,	  matching	  is	  rarely	  used	  in	  comparative	  studies	  because	  countries	  are	  too	  few	  and	  too	  diverse	  to	  
find	  close	  matches	  on	  all	  but	  very	  short	  lists	  of	  variables.15	  	  
Instead,	  most	  studies	  postulate	  a	  model	  of	  the	  interaction	  between	  the	  relevant	  variables	  and	  estimate	  
its	  coefficients.	  A	  typical	  model	  may	  be	  
(equitymarketsize) = a + b ⋅ (investor protection) + c ⋅ (countrysize) + dr ⋅ r + (residual)
r∈religions
∑ , 	  
where	  the	  residual	   is	  assumed	  to	  be	  uncorrelated	  with	  the	  other	  right-­‐hand-­‐side	  variables	  and	  a,	  b,	  c,	  
and	   the	   set	  of	  dr	  will	  be	  estimated	  with	   some	   technique	   such	  as	   linear	   regression.	  The	  benefit	  of	   this	  
approach	  over	  matching	   is	   that	   treated	  and	  untreated	  observations	  no	   longer	  need	   to	  be	   identical	   in	  
terms	  of	   the	   control	   variables	   (here,	   country	   size	   and	   religion).	   The	   cost	   is	   that	   this	  works	  only	   if	   the	  
variables	   truly	   interact	   only	   as	   postulated	   in	   the	  model.	   (For	   instance,	   the	   example	   above	   postulated	  
that	  the	  effects	  of	  investor	  protection,	  country	  size,	  and	  religion	  are	  additive	  and	  linear.)	  
In	  general,	  “controlling”	  is	  model	  specific	  and,	  hence,	  only	  as	  good	  as	  the	  model	  (e.g.,	  Leamer	  1983).	  In	  
principle,	   the	   model	   need	   not	   be	   as	   simplistic	   as	   in	   the	   example	   above	   and	   can	   include	   all	   sorts	   of	  
candidate	   interactions	   and	  nonlinear	   effects.	   In	   comparative	  practice,	   however,	   there	   are	   far	   too	   few	  
data	  points	  (countries)	  to	  estimate	  anything	  but	  simple	   linear	  models	  of	  the	  most	  obviously	   important	  
observed	   variables.	   In	   addition,	   and	   as	   with	   matching,	   many	   relevant	   variables	   cannot	   be	   included	  
because,	  at	  least	  in	  most	  countries,	  they	  are	  not	  observed	  or	  not	  measured.	  As	  a	  result,	  the	  model	  can	  
at	  best	  provide	  modest	  assurance	  that	  the	  relevant	  factors	  are	  even	  approximately	  “held	  constant.”	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15	  For	  example,	  one	  can	  never	  closely	  match	  the	  United	  States	  on	  financial	  market	  size	  because	  the	  United	  States	  
has	  by	  far	  the	  largest	  financial	  market	  in	  the	  world.	  One	  would	  get	  a	  closer	  but	  still	   imperfect	  match	  on	  financial	  
market	  size	   relative	   to	  GDP.	  The	  more	  variables	  one	  needs	   to	  match	  on,	   the	   fewer	  and	  poorer	   the	  matches	  will	  
become.	  Matching	  on	  the	  estimated	  propensity	  score	  (e.g.,	  Angrist	  &	  Pischke	  2009,	  section	  3.3.2)	  can	  help	  but	  is	  
only	  as	  good	  as	  the	  model	  for	  the	  propensity	  score	  (cf.	  the	  next	  two	  paragraphs	  in	  the	  main	  text).	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If	  there	  are	  at	  least	  two	  observations	  per	  country	  at	  different	  periods	  in	  time	  (panel	  data),	  a	  popular	  way	  
to	  deal	  with	  unobserved	  cross-­‐sectional	  heterogeneity	   is	  to	  remove	  it	  all	  using	  country	  fixed	  effects	  or	  
similar	  methods	  (see	  examples	  in	  Section	  3.4).16	  This	  leads	  to	  a	  comparison	  of	  changes	  rather	  than	  levels	  
and,	   for	   this	   reason,	   is	   often	   referred	   to	   as	   differences-­‐in-­‐differences	   (DD).	   For	   example,	   one	   could	  
estimate	   the	   relationship	   between	   shareholder	   protection	   and	   equity	   market	   size	   by	   examining	   the	  
cross-­‐country	  correlation,	  not	  of	  these	  two	  variables	  at	  some	  point	  in	  time,	  but	  of	  changes	  in	  these	  two	  
variables	   between	   two	   points	   in	   time.	   DD	   identifies	   a	   causal	   effect	   if	   the	   so-­‐called	   parallel	   trends	  
assumption	   holds,	   i.e.,	   if	   in	   expectation	   (and	   conditional	   on	   controls)	   all	   countries	   would	   have	  
experienced	   identical	   changes	   in	   outcomes	   (e.g.,	   equity	   market	   size)	   but	   for	   the	   change	   in	   the	  
explanatory	  variable	  of	  interest	  (e.g.,	  shareholder	  protection).	  Unfortunately,	  this	  assumption	  is	  usually	  
untenable	   in	   ECL	   because	   countries	   do	   not	   implement	   reforms	   randomly	   (cf.	   Rodrik	   2012).	   Reforms	  
often	   come	   in	   packages	   or	   react	   to	   changed	   circumstances	   unobserved	   by	   the	   researcher.17 	  For	  
example,	  many	  Asian	  countries	  improved	  shareholder	  protection	  in	  response	  to	  the	  Asian	  financial	  crisis	  
of	  1997/1998	  while	  they	  were	  recovering	  from	  a	  recession	  and	  implementing	  numerous	  other	  reforms.	  
Unless	  such	  contemporaneous	  changes	  are	  carefully	  controlled	   for-­‐-­‐-­‐and	   this	   is	  usually	  not	  possible	   in	  
ECL	  owing	  to	   lack	  of	  data	  and	  contextual	   information-­‐-­‐-­‐DD	  estimates	  of	  the	  causal	  effect	  can	  easily	  be	  
more	  biased	  than	  cross-­‐sectional	  estimates.18	  	  
Painful	   experience	   in	   other	   disciplines	   has	   shown	   that	   these	   are	   not	   merely	   abstract	   concerns.	   In	  
economics,	   Levine	   &	   Renelt	   (1992)	   revealed	   that	   almost	   all	   conclusions	   from	   cross-­‐country	   growth	  
regressions	   (as	   the	   literature	   then	   stood)	   were	   fragile	   to	   small	   changes	   in	   the	   selection	   of	   control	  
variables.	  At	  the	  time,	  cross-­‐country	  growth	  regressions	  followed	  the	  same	  template	  as	  most	  ECL	  today.	  
Worse,	   LaLonde	   (1986)	   showed	   failure	   even	   of	   DD	   in	   a	   setting	   with	   much	   larger	   sample	   sizes	   and	  
presumably	  less	  heterogeneity.	  LaLonde’s	  test	  was	  to	  compare	  experimental	  estimates	  of	  the	  earnings	  
effect	  of	  a	  job-­‐training	  program,	  which	  were	  significantly	  positive,	  with	  observational	  estimates	  for	  the	  
same	  program	  and	  data,	  which	  were	  mostly	  negative	  for	  men	  and	  much	  higher	  than	  the	  experimental	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16	  With	  sufficiently	  long	  time	  series,	  even	  biases	  from	  unobserved	  time-­‐variant	  variables	  can	  be	  removed	  (Abadie	  
et	  al.	  2010,	  2015).	  There	  are	  other	  ways	  of	  using	  panel	  data	  that	  do	  not	  remove	  all	  cross-­‐sectional	  variation;	  they	  
are	  affected	  by	  a	  mixture	  of	  the	  problems	  discussed	  in	  this	  and	  the	  previous	  paragraph,	  and	  my	  sense	  is	  that	  they	  
tend	  to	  obscure	  rather	  than	  ameliorate	  them.	  
	  
17	  Diffusion	  studies	  present	  a	   special	   case	  of	   these	  problems	   (Spamann	  2010a,	   sect.	   IV.C).	  Diffusion	  studies	   infer	  
foreign	  influence	  from	  an	  increase	  in	  the	  probability	  of	  adopting	  a	  measure	  after	  candidate	  leader	  countries	  have	  
adopted	  the	  measure.	  The	  problem	  here	  is	  that	  the	  follower	  countries	  might	  just	  be	  reacting	  to	  the	  same	  common	  
shocks	  to	  market	  organization,	  technology,	  security	  threats,	  and	  the	  like,	  rather	  than	  to	  legal	  change	  in	  the	  leader	  
country.	  
	  
18	  A	   separate	   problem	   is	   that	   DD	   also	   amplifies	   the	   effect	   of	   noise	   if	   and	   because	   the	   temporal	   variation	   in	  
measurement	  error	  relative	  to	   its	   level	   is	   larger	  than	  that	   in	  the	  variables	  of	   interest.	  On	  a	  technical	  note,	  many	  
studies	  in	  empirical	  comparative	  law	  do	  not	  account	  for	  the	  fact	  that	  repeated	  observations	  from	  the	  same	  country	  
are	  not	  statistically	  independent.	  This	  omission	  may	  severely	  exaggerate	  the	  precision	  of	  DD	  estimates	  (Bertrand	  et	  
al.	  2004).	  The	  standard	  fix	  is	  clustering	  of	  the	  standard	  errors	  (by	  country),	  but	  other	  methods	  may	  be	  necessary	  if	  
the	  number	  of	  changes	  is	  small	  (Cameron	  &	  Miller	  2015).	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ones	   for	  women	   (cf.	  Glazerman	  et	   al.	   2003).19	  In	  epidemiology,	  prominent	   cases	   include	  experimental	  
refutation	   of	   observational	   claims	   that	   hormone	   replacement	   or	   certain	   vitamins	   reduce	   the	   risk	   of	  
coronary	   heart	   disease	   and	   other	   ills	   (e.g.,	   Hartz	   et	   al.	   2013;	   Lawlor	   et	   al.	   2004a,b;	   Smith	  &	   Ebrahim	  
2002).20	  
Under	  the	  impression	  of	  these	  and	  other	  failures,	  modern	  empiricists	  tend	  to	  be	  extremely	  skeptical	  of	  
cross-­‐country	   regressions.	   For	   example,	   Klick	   (2013,	   908)	   commented	   on	   Djankov	   et	   al.	   (2003)	   that	  
“[t]his	   kind	   of	   cross-­‐sectional	   comparison	   has	   no	   chance	   of	   sorting	   out	   these	   issues,	   and	   conclusions	  
based	  on	  this	  analysis	  are	  close	  to	  worthless	  in	  terms	  of	  having	  confidence	  in	  causality.”	  
4.3.	  	  Natural	  Experiments	  and	  Instrumental	  Variables	  
Such	   disillusionment	   prompted	   what	   Angrist	   &	   Pischke	   (2010)	   called	   “the	   credibility	   revolution	   in	  
empirical	   economics”	   (and,	   increasingly,	   political	   science):	   the	   search	   for	   natural	   experiments.	  
Conceptually,	   natural	   experiments	   are	   controlling	   in	   reverse:	   Rather	   than	   attempt	   to	   control	   for	  
confounding	   factors	  during	  estimation,	  knowledge	  of	   the	  “treatment”	  assignment	  mechanism	  (lottery,	  
admission	  threshold,	  etc.)	  is	  used	  to	  argue	  that	  no	  confounding	  factors	  are	  at	  work	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  This	  
so-­‐called	   unconfoundedness	   assumption	   is	   partially	   testable	   because	   it	   implies	   that	   the	   covariates	  
should	  be	  balanced	  between	  treated	  and	  untreated	  groups.	  
Importantly,	  “treatment”	  X	  (e.g.,	  good	  shareholder	  protection)	  need	  not	  be	  (quasi-­‐)	  randomly	  assigned	  
itself.	  Instead,	  it	  is	  sufficient	  if	  
1. (“first	  stage”)	  some	  third	  variable	  Z	  monotonically	  affects	  X	  (this	  can	  be	  tested	  empirically).	  
2. (“exclusion	  restriction”)	  Z	  is	  not	  in	  any	  way	  correlated	  with	  the	  outcome	  Y	  except	  through	  its	  
effect	  on	  X;	  that	  is,	  Z	  is	  “exogenous”	  (this	  is	  an	  untestable	  assumption).	  
If	  these	  two	  conditions	  are	  satisfied,	  then	  the	  causal	  effect	  of	  X	  on	  Y	  can	  be	  estimated	  as	  the	  ratio	  of	  the	  
estimated	  effect	  of	  Z	  on	  Y	  over	  the	  estimated	  effect	  of	  Z	  on	  X	  (e.g.,	  Angrist	  &	  Pischke	  2009,	  ch.	  4).	  Here	  Z	  
is	  called	  an	  instrumental	  variable	  (IV).	  For	  example,	  La	  Porta	  et	  al.	  (1998)	  initially	  introduced	  legal	  origin	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19	  That	  is,	  the	  observational	  estimates	  were	  derived	  from	  the	  same	  data	  but	  without	  knowledge	  of	  which	  applicant	  
was	   assigned	   to	   the	   treatment	   group	   and	   hence	   eligible	   (but	   not	   required)	   to	   receive	   the	   training.	   The	  
observational	  estimates	  were	  thus	  confounded	  by	  the	  usual	  problem	  that	  of	  two	  people	  with	   identical	  observed	  
earnings	   and	   other	   characteristics,	   the	   one	   to	   apply	   for	   a	   training	   program	   tends	   to	   be	   the	   one	   whose	   job	  
prospects	   are	   bleaker	   for	   some	   unobserved	   reason.	   A	   simple	   comparison	   of	   post-­‐training	   earnings	   risks	  
misattributing	  the	  effect	  of	  the	  initial	  bleak	  circumstances	  to	  the	  training	  program.	  The	  candidate	  “effect”	  (wages)	  
in	  fact	  influences	  the	  candidate	  “cause”	  (enrolling	  in	  a	  training	  program).	  This	  problem	  is	  known	  as	  “endogeneity,”	  
but	  it	  can	  also	  be	  cast	  as	  an	  omitted	  variable	  problem	  because	  job	  prospects	  are	  not	  observable	  to	  the	  researcher.	  
An	  example	  of	   an	  equivalent	  problem	   in	   comparative	   law	   is	   the	  possibility	   that	  high	   latent	   crime	   triggers	  harsh	  
criminal	   law,	   leading	   to	   a	   positive	   correlation	   between	   crime	   and	   punishment	   even	   though	   punishment	   does	  
reduce	  crime,	  everything	  else	  being	  equal.	  
	  
20	  Grodstein	  et	  al.	  (2003)	  point	  out	  that	  experimental	  evidence	  did	  confirm	  many	  other	  epidemiological	  estimates.	  
ECL	  works	  with	  far	  less	  data	  than	  epidemiology,	  so	  one	  should	  not	  expect	  ECL	  estimates	  to	  have	  the	  same	  success	  
rate.	  That	  being	  said,	  I	  share	  the	  view	  that	  observational	  data	  remain	  useful,	  see	  subsection	  4.4	  below.	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to	  the	  literature	  as	  an	  instrument	  for	  shareholder	  protection	  in	  an	  effort	  to	  estimate	  the	  latter’s	  effect	  
on	  equity	  market	  outcomes.	  
IV	   is	   the	   only	   type	   of	   natural	   experiment	   that	   has	   found	   wide	   application	   in	   ECL.21	  There	   are	   three	  
mutually	   reinforcing	   reasons,	   however,	   to	   be	   very	   skeptical	   about	   IV	   estimates	   in	   ECL.22	  First,	   the	   IV	  
estimator	  is	  notoriously	  unreliable-­‐-­‐-­‐in	  particular,	  biased	  away	  from	  zero-­‐-­‐-­‐in	  small	  samples	  (Bound	  et	  al.	  
1995),	  and	  the	  samples	  of	  ECL	  are	  extremely	  small.	  Second,	  the	  exclusion	  restriction	  will	  rarely,	  if	  ever,	  
hold	   in	   comparative	   applications.	   Country-­‐level	   factors	   do	  not	   cleanly	   affect,	   let	   alone	   correlate	  with,	  
only	   one	   variable	   of	   interest.	   For	   example,	   legal	   origin	   correlates	   with	  multiple	   policy	  measures	   and	  
outcomes,	  disqualifying	  it	  as	  an	  instrument	  for	  any	  one	  of	  them	  (La	  Porta	  et	  al.	  2008).	  The	  same	  problem	  
was	   discovered	   in	  many	   variables	   that	  were	   initially	   used	   as	   instruments	   in	   the	   cross-­‐country	   growth	  
literature	   (Bazzi	  &	  Clemens	   2013,	  Durlauf	   et	   al.	   2005).	   Third,	   the	   increasingly	   far-­‐fetched	   instruments	  
that	  researchers	  have	  turned	  to	  in	  response	  to	  the	  second	  problem	  are	  a	  priori	  weak	  instruments,	  i.e.,	  
they	  should	  be	  expected	  to	  have	  only	  a	  weak	  first-­‐stage	  effect.	  Weak	   instruments	  exacerbate	  the	  first	  
and	   the	   second	   problem,	   however,	   because	   the	   small	   sample	   bias	   and	   the	   bias	   from	   any	   remaining	  
violation	  of	  the	  exclusion	  restriction	  are	  inversely	  related	  to	  the	  strength	  of	  the	  instrument	  (Bound	  et	  al.	  
1995).	  If	  an	  a	  priori	  weak	  instrument	  yields	  a	  strong	  first	  stage	  in	  the	  data	  at	  hand,	  this	  first	  stage	  result	  
is	  more	  likely	  a	  false	  positive	  (cf.	  Section	  5.3	  below).	  
4.4.	  	   Summary:	  A	  More	  Modest	  Agenda	  
In	  summary,	  comparative	  data	  alone	  can	  rarely	  and	  perhaps	  never	  answer	  nontrivial	  causal	  questions.	  
Attempts	  at	  causal	   inference	  using	  DD	  or	   IV	  will	  be	  grossly	  misleading	   if	   the	  treacherous	  conditions	  of	  
these	  methods	  are	  not	  met;	  thus,	  they	  can	  do	  more	  harm	  than	  good.	  
That	   being	   said,	   comparative	   data	   remain	   important	   for	   assessing	   causal	   claims.	   They	   may	   not	  
affirmatively	  pin	  down	  any	  particular	  cause,	  but	  they	  can	  considerably	  reduce	  the	  set	  of	  plausible	  ones.	  
Comparative	  patterns	  are	  more	  consistent	  with	  some	  theories	  than	  with	  others	  (Durlauf	  2009,	  Mankiw	  
1995).23	  Establishing	   such	   patterns	   should	   be	   considered	   a	   priority,	   and	  much	   remains	   to	   be	   done.24	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21	  For	  example,	  Licht	  et	  al.	  (2007),	  Givati	  &	  Troiano	  (2012),	  and	  Dari-­‐Mattiacci	  &	  Guerrero	  (2015)	  use	  language	  as	  
instruments	   for	   culture	   in	   order	   to	   tease	   out	   the	   latter’s	   effect	   on	   law.	   Besides	   IV,	   the	   other	   type	   of	   natural	  
experiment	  is	  to	  exploit	  discontinuities	  around	  a	  cutoff,	  such	  as	  an	  international	  border	  (cf.	  Keele	  &	  Titiunik	  2015).	  
The	  only	  example	  of	  this	  in	  ECL	  is	  Bubb	  (2013).	  The	  reason	  why	  discontinuities	  are	  difficult	  to	  exploit	  in	  ECL	  is	  that	  
many	  legal	  rules	  change	  simultaneously	  at	  the	  border,	  such	  that	  the	  discontinuity	  in	  outcomes,	  if	  there	  is	  one,	  does	  
not	   identify	  the	  effect	  of	  any	  one	  of	  the	  legal	  changes.	  The	  point	  of	  Bubb	  (2013)	  was	  to	  show	  that	  there	  was	  no	  
discontinuous	  change	  in	  outcomes	  at	  the	  border,	  providing	  evidence	  against	  any	  effect	  of	  law	  (although	  in	  theory	  
his	  results	  are	  also	  consistent	  with	  multiple	  offsetting	  changes).	  
	  
22	  Consistent	   with	   this	   skepticism,	   Albouy	   (2012)	   argues	   that	   the	   most	   famous	   comparative	   result	   using	   an	  
instrumental	  variable	   (settler	  mortality;	  Acemoglu	  et	  al.	  2001)	  was	  an	  artifact	  of	  measurement	  and	  specification	  
error.	  
	  
23	  For	  an	  example	  using	  comparative	  data	  in	  this	  conservative	  way,	  see.,	  e.g.,	  Givati	  (2014).	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Although	   the	  patterns	  will	  always	  be	  subject	   to	  omitted	  variable	  bias,	   certain	  biases	  are	   less	  plausible	  
than	  others	  (cf.	  Oster	  2014).	  
Used	  carefully,	  comparative	  estimates	  can	  complement	  even	  experimental	  estimates	  of	  causal	  effects,	  
considered	   the	   gold	   standard	   of	   empirical	   research.	   Experimental	   estimates	   cleanly	   identify	   causal	  
effects	  in	  a	  particular	  setting	  (internal	  validity),	  but	  they	  cannot	  by	  themselves	  establish	  that	  the	  effect	  
would	   be	   similar	   in	   a	   different	   setting	   (external	   validity)	   (cf.	   Rodrik	   2009,	   Sims	   2010).	   Natural	  
experiments	  also	  rely	  on	  identifying	  assumptions	  that	  may	  turn	  out	  to	  be	  wrong	  (cf.	  section	  4.3	  above).	  
Comparative	   data	   can	   thus	   be	   important	   in	   assessing	   the	   generalizability	   and	   robustness	   of	   (quasi-­‐
)experimental	  findings.	  
For	  example,	  quasi-­‐experimental	  estimates	  of	  prison’s	  deterrence	  and	  incapacitation	  effects	  vary	  widely	  
in	   magnitude	   (see	   references	   in	   Spamann	   forthcoming).	   If	   the	   larger	   estimates	   were	   the	   more	  
representative	  ones,	   then	  the	  US,	  which	  has	  by	   far	   the	  highest	   incarceration	  rate	   in	   the	  world,	  should	  
have	   considerably	   lower	   crime	   rates	   than	   comparable	   countries.	   While	   no	   individual	   country	   is	  
comparable	   to	   the	   US	   in	   this	   sense,	   a	   synthetic	   comparison	   can	   be	   constructed	   from	   cross-­‐country	  
regressions,	  and	  it	  does	  not	  have	  higher	  crime	  rates	  than	  the	  US	  (but	  a	  much	  lower	  incarceration	  rate).	  
Section	   4.2	   above	   explained	   why	   this	   comparison	   can	   only	   be	   a	   rough	   approximation.	   But	   even	   the	  
rough	  approximation	  reveals	  the	  inability	  of	  some	  factors	  (those	  included	  in	  the	  regression),	  and	  allows	  
quantifying	  the	  size	  required	  of	  other	  factors,	  to	  reconcile	  US	  crime	  and	  incarceration	  rates	  with	  strong	  
deterrence	  and	   incapacitation	  effects.	  Whereas	   the	   list	  of	   factors	   that	  might	   theoretically	   increase	  US	  
crime	   rates	   is	   infinite,	   the	   list	  of	  plausible	  ones	   is	   arguably	   short.	   This	   list	   can	  be	   further	  pruned	  with	  
circumstantial	  evidence,	  including	  US-­‐specific	  evidence.	  In	  this	  way,	  cross-­‐country	  data	  can	  contribute	  to	  
assessing	  the	  plausible	  strength	  of	  deterrence	  and	  incapacitation	  across	  the	  US	  criminal	  justice	  system,	  
even	   though	   cross-­‐sectional	   comparative	   data	   cannot	   directly	   identify	   these	   effects	   (Spamann,	  
forthcoming).	  
5.	  	   Other	  Methodological	  Issues	  
I	  now	  review	  certain	  features	  of	  empirical	  research	  that	  assume	  particular	  importance	  in	  ECL,	  regardless	  
of	   whether	   causal	   inference	   is	   attempted.	   They	   divide	   into	   collecting,	   analyzing,	   and	   interpreting	  
comparative	   data.	   All	   three	   depend	   on	   the	   hypothesis	   under	   investigation,	   and	   all	   are	   connected.	   In	  
particular,	  the	  better	  the	  measurement	  and	  the	  controls,	  the	  stronger	  will	  be	  the	  conclusions	  that	  can	  
be	  drawn	  from	  the	  data.	  
5.1.	  	  Data	  Collection:	  Measurement	  
Comparative	   work	   in	   general	   and	   comparative	   legal	   work	   in	   particular	   face	   special	   difficulties	   in	  
designing	  and	  collecting	  consistent	  measurements.	  Even	  unemployment	  rates	  were	  difficult	  to	  compare	  
across	   countries	   before	   the	   OECD	   created	   its	   harmonized	   unemployment	   rates.	   Modern	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24	  For	  example,	  data	  on	  the	  number,	  size,	  and	  budget	  of	  courts	  have	  become	  available	  only	  recently	  and	  only	  for	  
the	   member	   states	   of	   the	   Council	   of	   Europe,	   and	   even	   that	   only	   with	   significant	   qualifications	   regarding	   the	  
comparability	  of	  the	  data	  (European	  Commission	  for	  the	  Efficiency	  of	  Justice	  2014).	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communications	   technology	  has	  considerably	  eased	   the	  problem	  of	  access	   to	   foreign	   raw	   information	  
such	   as	   statutes	   or	   case	   law.	   Such	   technology	   now	   includes	   crowdsourcing	   sites	   like	  
nomography.wustl.edu	  and	  participedia.net.	  The	  real	  difficulty,	  however,	  is	  to	  distill	  the	  raw	  information	  
into	  a	  measure	  that	  achieves	  a	  close	  fit	  between	  the	  facts	  and	  the	  concept	  (validity)	   in	  a	  reproducible,	  
consistent	  manner	  (reliability)	  
Earlier	  failures	  have	  demonstrated	  that	  reliable	  measurement	  of	  alien	  legal	   institutions	  requires	  a	  very	  
detailed	  coding	  protocol	  and	  usually	  also	  the	   involvement	  of	   lawyers	   in	  collecting	  and	  coding	  the	  data	  
(Spamann	  2010b,c).	  Some	  legal	  institutions	  may	  be	  sufficiently	  straightforward	  for	  lay	  coding,	  as	  is	  done	  
in	   the	   CCP.	   However,	   for	  more	   complex	   questions	   such	   as	   the	   resolution	   of	   a	   particular	   case	   or	   the	  
legality	  of	  a	  transaction,	  it	  is	  hard	  to	  imagine	  that	  lay	  coders	  could	  correctly	  combine	  or	  even	  locate	  all	  
relevant	  materials.	  To	  enable	  others	  to	  verify	  and	  replicate	  the	  measurement,	  it	  is	  also	  advisable	  to	  post	  
the	  raw	  data	  and	  coding	  protocol	  online	  (cf.	  Spamann	  2008).	  
The	   validity	   of	   comparative	   measures	   may	   be	   compromised	   by	   the	   inconsistency	   of	   meaning	   or	  
importance	   of	   certain	   features	   across	   countries.	   For	   example,	   some	   statutory	   provision	  may	   be	   very	  
important	  for	  shareholder	  protection	  in	  one	  country	  but	  irrelevant	  in	  another	  because	  of	  the	  absence	  or	  
presence	   of	   certain	   other	   rules	   or	   institutions	   (Black	   et	   al.	   2014).	   Similarly,	   some	   institution	  may	   be	  
important	  in	  one	  country	  but	  redundant	  in	  another	  because	  of	  the	  presence	  of	  a	  functional	  equivalent	  
(on	   functional	   equivalence,	   see	  Michaels	   2006).	  Whether	   the	  measure	   should	   take	   into	   account	   such	  
functional	  equivalents	   is	  determined	  by	  the	  measured	  concept	  and,	  thus	  ultimately,	  by	  the	  hypothesis	  
under	   investigation.	   For	   example,	   the	   hypothesis	   may	   be	   specifically	   about	   the	   effect	   of	   statutory	  
shareholder	  protection,	  perhaps	  because	  this	  is	  the	  only	  concept	  under	  policy	  makers’	  direct	  control.	  In	  
this	   case,	   taking	   into	   account	   case	   law	   or	   legal	   practice	   in	  measurement	  would	   diminish	   rather	   than	  
increase	   the	   measure’s	   validity,	   notwithstanding	   the	   fact	   that	   case	   law	   and	   practice	   may	   be	   very	  
important	  for	  broader	  concepts	  of	  shareholder	  protection.	  Conceptual	  clarity	  is	  thus	  a	  precondition	  for	  
valid	  measurement.	  Besides,	  amorphous	  concepts	  such	  as	  shareholder	  protection	  may	  require	   further	  
refinement	   before	   a	   discussion	   of	   validity	   can	   even	   begin	   (Bebchuk	   &	   Hamdani	   2009;	   see	   generally	  
Adcock	  &	  Collier	  2001).	  
Legal	   measurement	   design	   has	   made	   considerable	   progress.	   Measuring	   law	   is	   no	   longer	   limited	   to	  
counting	  the	  presence	  or	  absence	  of	  certain	  statutory	  rights	  (as	  in,	  e.g.,	  Djankov	  et	  al.	  2008b,	  La	  Porta	  et	  
al.	   1998).	   One	   possible	   improvement	   is	   to	   determine	   the	   weight	   of	   individual	   components	   through	  
factor	   analysis	   (Rosenthal	   &	   Voeten	   2007).	   A	   more	   fundamental	   improvement	   is	   to	   account	   for	   the	  
interaction	   of	   different	   rules	   by	   coding,	   not	   the	   rules,	   but	   the	   treatment	   of	   a	   paradigmatic	   case	   (cf.	  
Djankov	  et	  al.	  2008a,	  World	  Bank	  2014)	  or,	  better,	  several	  cases	  (resembling	  the	  common	  core	  approach	  
in	   classical	   comparative	   law	   [common-­‐core.org],	   see	   Michaels	   2009,	   Spamann	   2009).	   Nonlegal	  
phenomena	  can	  serve	  as	  an	   indirect	  measure	   if	   they	  are	  plausibly	  directly	  and	  strongly	   related	   to	   the	  
legal	   aspect	   of	   interest.	   For	   example,	   the	   average	  discount	   at	  which	  minority	   shares	   trade	   relative	   to	  
control	  blocks	   (Dyck	  &	  Zingales	  2004)	   is	  arguably	  a	  direct	   function	  of	  minority	  shareholder	  protection,	  
albeit	  not	  only	  legal	  shareholder	  protection.	  When	  more	  than	  one	  measure	  is	  available,	  all	  measures	  can	  
be	  synthesized	  into	  one	  superior	  measure	  (e.g.,	  Pemstein	  et	  al.	  2010).	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In	   principle,	   the	   quality	   of	  measurement	   can	   be	   explicitly	   validated	   empirically.	   In	   particular,	   one	   can	  
verify	   that	   the	  measurement	  correlates	  with	  other	  measurements	  of	   the	  same	  concept,	  or	  with	  other	  
variables	  with	  which	   the	   concept	   is	   known	   to	   correlate	   (Adcock	   &	   Collier	   2001).	   Unfortunately,	   such	  
opportunities	  are	  rarely	  available	   in	  ECL	   (but	  cf.	  Hallward-­‐Driemeier	  &	  Pritchett	  2015,	  Ríos-­‐Figueroa	  &	  
Staton	   2012,	   Spamann	   2010b).	   As	   a	   result,	   studies	   tend	   to	   test	   joint	   hypotheses:	   the	   substantive	  
hypothesis	  and	  the	  hypothesis	  that	  the	  measurement	  of	  the	  relevant	  concept	  is	  valid	  (or	  as	  many	  such	  
hypotheses	  as	  there	  are	  concepts	  involved).	  I	  return	  to	  this	  problem	  in	  subsection	  5.3.	  
5.2.	  	  Data	  Analysis:	  Controlling	  Revisited	  
In	   data	   analysis,	   it	   is	   important	   to	   control	   as	   comprehensively,	   flexibly,	   and	   transparently	   as	   possible	  
because	   candidate	   causes	   (“treatments”)	   are	   not	   randomly	   assigned	   in	   ECL.	   Without	   random	  
assignment,	  other	  variables	  may	  be	  systematically	  correlated	  with	  the	  treatment	  and	  bias	  the	  estimate	  
of	  the	  effect	  of	  interest.	  Though	  it	  may	  be	  impossible	  to	  eliminate	  all	  potential	  confounds	  and	  identify	  a	  
particular	  causal	  effect	  (see	  Section	  4.2),	  sensible	  controlling	  will	  help	  a	  great	  deal	  in	  limiting	  the	  set	  of	  
plausible	   biases	   and,	   ultimately,	   plausible	   causal	   relationships.	   In	   this	   respect,	   ECL	   has	  much	   to	   learn	  
from	  modern	  growth	  empirics	  (cf.	  Durlauf	  2001,	  2009;	  Durlauf	  et	  al.	  2005).	  
Current	  practice	  in	  ECL	  is	  to	  select	  a	  small	  number	  of	  controls	  ad	  hoc.	  This	  practice	  is	  motivated	  by	  the	  
fact	   that	   ECL	   samples	   are	   small,	   such	   that	   it	   is	   not	   possible	   to	   estimate	   precisely	   a	   larger	   number	   of	  
parameters	  with	  classical	  methods.	  Ad	  hoc	  selection	  merely	  gives	  a	  semblance	  of	  precision,	  however,	  by	  
neglecting	   model	   uncertainty.	   Three	   improvements	   are	   available.	   First,	   missing	   data	   for	   individual	  
observations	  can	  be	   imputed	  to	   increase	  sample	  size.	   Imputation	  not	  only	  avoids	  wasting	   information,	  
but	   also	   reduces	   selection	  bias	   (Honaker	  &	  King	   2010,	   Little	  &	  Rubin	   2002).	   Second,	  model-­‐averaging	  
techniques	   can	   explicitly	   account	   for	   model	   uncertainty	   (e.g.,	   Magnus	   et	   al.	   2010).	   Third,	   in	   some	  
applications,	  principled	  selection	  among	  controls	  is	  possible	  even	  when	  the	  number	  of	  possible	  controls	  
is	  larger	  than	  the	  sample	  size	  (Belloni	  et	  al.	  2014).	  The	  latter	  assumes	  that	  the	  number	  of	  truly	  relevant	  
factors	  is	  ultimately	  small.	  This	  so-­‐called	  sparsity	  assumption	  is	  strong,	  but	  if	  it	  is	  considered	  false,	  then	  
comparative	  research	  should	  arguably	  be	  abandoned	  because	  there	   is	  no	  hope	  of	   identifying	  complex	  
connections	  with	  few	  data	  points.25	  	  
Yet,	   there	   is	   also	   a	   danger	   of	   controlling	   too	  much.	   To	   be	  more	   precise,	   the	   use	   of	   certain	   controls	  
implies	   assumptions	   that	   may	   not	   be	   plausible	   or	   may	   change	   the	   interpretation	   of	   the	   results.	   In	  
particular,	  if	  a	  regression	  is	  supposed	  to	  approximate	  a	  causal	  relationship,	  using	  a	  variable	  as	  a	  control	  
implicitly	  assumes	  that	  the	  variable	   is	  exogenous,	   i.e.,	  not	  affected	  by	  the	  outcome	  variable.	   If	   it	  were	  
affected	  (i.e.,	  endogenous),	   then	  the	  estimates	   for	  all	  of	   the	  regression’s	   independent	  variables	  would	  
be	  biased	   in	  generally	  unknown	  ways	   relative	   to	   their	   true	  causal	  effects.	  Although	  the	   importance	  of	  
the	   exogeneity	   assumption	   is	   well	   known	   in	   the	   abstract,	   its	   consequences	   are	   not	   always	   fully	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25	  This	  is	  the	  “bet	  on	  sparsity”	  principle	  coined	  by	  Hastie	  et	  al.	  (2009,	  p.	  611):	  “Use	  a	  procedure	  that	  does	  well	  in	  
sparse	   problems,	   since	   no	   procedure	   does	   well	   in	   dense	   problems.”	   But	   see	   Gelman	   (2011),	   who	   argues	   that	  
sparsity	  is	  inapposite	  in	  social	  science.	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appreciated.	  For	  example,	  most	  studies,	  including	  all	  of	  the	  literature	  in	  Law	  and	  Finance	  as	  well	  as	  legal	  
origins,	  control	  for	  GDP	  per	  capita.	  The	  resulting	  estimates	  are	  unbiased	  only	  if	  GDP	  is	  exogenous,	  i.e.,	  if	  
the	  outcome	  variables,	  such	  as	  financial	  market	  size	  or	  the	  quality	  of	  judicial	  procedures,	  have	  no	  effect	  
on	  GDP.	  This	  is	  possible,	  but	  it	  would	  make	  the	  estimates	  much	  less	  policy	  relevant.	  
5.3	  	  	   Interpretation	  
Last	  but	  not	  least,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  interpret	  results	  sensibly	  in	  light	  of	  prior	  information,	  including	  the	  
study	  design.	  I	  have	  discussed	  the	  obstacles	  to	  causal	  inference	  (Section	  4)	  and	  the	  steps	  that	  should	  be	  
taken	  to	  at	   least	  reduce	  the	  number	  of	  alternative	  causal	   interpretations	  (Section	  5.2).	  That	  discussion	  
was	  mostly	  concerned	  with	  bias,	  i.e.,	  the	  possibility	  that	  the	  estimate	  would	  systematically	  be	  higher	  or	  
lower	   than	   the	   true	  effect	  because	  of	   confounding	  with	  other	  effects	   such	  as	   selection.	   I	  now	  turn	   to	  
spuriousness,	  i.e.,	  the	  possibility	  that	  the	  estimate	  on	  a	  particular	  sample	  is	  fortuitously	  higher	  or	  lower	  
than	   the	   true	  effect	  because	  of	   sampling	  error.	   For	  example,	   the	   treatment	  group	   in	  a	  drug	   trial	  may	  
fortuitously	  contain	  a	  disproportionate	  number	  of	  subjects	  with	  hidden	  health	  problems,	  which	  would	  
make	  the	  drug’s	  efficacy	  appear	  less	  than	  it	  truly	  is.	  
Unlike	   bias,	   sampling	   error	   will	   differ	   from	   sample	   to	   sample.	   As	   a	   result,	   replication	   on	   a	   new,	  
independent	  sample	  could	  address	   suspicions	   that	   the	   finding	   is	   spurious.	   In	  ECL,	   this	   is	   cold	  comfort.	  
Usually,	   there	   is	   only	   one	   sample,	   which	   is	   the	   set	   of	   existing	   countries	   on	   Earth,	   or	   perhaps	   some	  
relevant	   subset	   thereof.26	  Replication	   is	   therefore	   not	   an	   option	   in	   ECL.	   Consequently,	   ECL	  must	   pay	  
particular	  attention	  to	  spuriousness	  in	  interpreting	  its	  results.	  
The	  standard	  way	  of	  dealing	  with	  sampling	  error	  is	  to	  derive	  an	  estimate	  of	  the	  sampling	  variation	  (the	  
standard	  error)	  from	  the	  data	  to	  calculate	  the	  probability	  of	  (erroneously)	  estimating	  an	  effect	  of	  equal	  
or	  greater	  size	  under	  the	  null	  hypothesis	  of	  no	  effect-­‐-­‐-­‐the	  p-­‐value.27	  A	  p-­‐value	  of	  10%	  or	  perhaps	  5%	  is	  
commonly	   considered	   statistically	   significant	   and	   tends	   to	  be	   required	   for	   publication.	  However,	   as	   is	  
well	  known	  in	  theory	  and	  increasingly	  appreciated	  in	  practice	  in	  other	  disciplines,	  low	  reported	  p-­‐values	  
are	   insufficient	   to	   address	   spuriousness	   (see,	   e.g.,	   Pashler	   &	   Wagenmakers	   2012).28	  There	   are	   two	  
reasons	  for	  this.	  
First,	   because	   of	  multitesting,	   the	   true	   probability	   of	   falsely	   rejecting	   the	   null	   hypothesis	   tends	   to	   be	  
much	  higher	   than	   the	   reported	  p-­‐value.	   It	   is	   common	   for	   individual	   researchers	   to	   try	  many	  variables	  
and	  specifications	  and	  report	  only	  the	  “successful”	  ones.	  In	  any	  event,	  researchers	  collectively	  try	  many	  
more	   variables	   and	   specifications,	   and	   only	   the	   “successful”	   researchers	   publish	   their	   findings.	   The	  
problem	  here	   is	  not	  multitesting	  per	   se,	   as	  extensive	   testing	  and	  even	   filtering	  of	  promising	   results	   is	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26	  Cf.	  notes	  1	  and	  2	  above.	  
27	  Estimating	  standard	  errors	  can	  be	   tricky.	  One	   issue	  of	  particular	   importance	   to	  comparative	  studies	   is	   that	  no	  
country	  is	  literally	  independent	  from	  all	  others,	  as	  would	  be	  required	  for	  standard	  methods	  of	  calculating	  standard	  
errors.	   This	   issue	   has	   not	   received	   attention	   in	   ECL,	   presumably	   on	   the	   assumption	   that	   it	   is	  minor.	   The	   latter	  
assumption	  is	  in	  tension	  with	  the	  findings	  of	  the	  diffusion	  literature	  (see	  section	  3.3.	  above).	  
28	  An	   additional	   problem	   is	   that	   an	   exclusive	   focus	   on	   statistical	   significance	   does	   not	   take	   into	   account	   the	  
respective	  consequences	  of	  erring	  on	  one	  side	  or	  another.	  See,	  e.g.,	  Ziliak	  &	  McCloskey	  (2007).	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desirable.	  Rather,	  the	  problem	  is	  that	  the	  reported	  p-­‐values	  are	  grossly	  understated.	  Reported	  p-­‐values	  
assume	  that	  only	  a	  single	  study	  was	  performed.	  But	  the	  greater	  the	  number	  of	  (unreported)	  studies,	  the	  
greater	  the	  probability	  of	  finding	  a	  spurious	  result	  above	  a	  certain	  size.29	  
Second,	  by	  definition,	  p-­‐values	  are	  not	  equal	  to	  the	  probability	  that	  the	  null	  hypothesis	  is	  correct,	  nor	  is	  
one	  minus	   the	   p-­‐value	   equal	   to	   the	   probability	   that	   the	   alternative	   hypothesis	   is	   correct.	   Rather,	   the	  
odds	  for	  the	  alternative	  hypothesis	  after	  seeing	  the	  data	  (the	  posterior	  odds)	  are	  equal	  to	  the	  odds	  prior	  
to	  seeing	  the	  data	  multiplied	  by	  the	  Bayes	  factor,	  which	  is	  the	  ratio	  of	  the	  prior	  probabilities	  of	  the	  data	  
under	  the	  alternative	  and	  the	  null	  hypotheses,	  respectively	  (e.g.,	  Kass	  &	  Raftery	  1995).	  Of	  this	  formula’s	  
two	   factors,	   only	   the	   Bayes	   factor	   is	   loosely	   related	   to	   the	   p-­‐value	   (e.g.,	   Strnad	   2007,	   sect.	   2.2).	   The	  
other	   factor	   (the	  prior	  odds)	  means	  that	  prior	  plausibility	  matters	  even	  after	  seeing	  the	  data.	  A	  wildly	  
implausible	  theory	  may	  become	  less	  implausible	  after	  seeing	  the	  data,	  but	  unless	  the	  result	  is	  extremely	  
strong,	  the	  theory	  will	  remain	  implausible.	  Importantly,	  multitesting	  presumably	  implies	  that	  any	  of	  the	  
tested	  models/theories	  has	  a	   low	  prior	  probability	  of	  being	  true,	  or	  else	  fewer	  models/theories	  would	  
have	  been	  tested	  (Cox	  2006,	  p.	  88).	  
The	  formula	  for	  the	  posterior	  odds	  also	  emphasizes	  that	  a	  test	  can	  be	  informative	  only	  to	  the	  extent	  the	  
predictions	   of	   the	   null	   and	   the	   alternative	   differ.	   At	   first	   sight,	   this	   may	   not	   seem	   very	   important	  
because	  a	  particular	  point	  estimate	  is	  naturally	  much	  more	  likely	  to	  arise	  if	  the	  true	  effect	  is	  equal	  to	  or	  
close	  to	  the	  point	  estimate	  (the	  usual	  interpretation)	  than	  if	  the	  true	  effect	  is	  zero.	  But	  an	  effect	  of	  that	  
size	  may	  not	  be	  plausible,	  and	  an	  effect	  of	  plausible	  size	  may	  not	  yield	  very	  different	  predictions	  from	  
the	   null	   (cf.	   Gelman	   &	   Carlin	   2011).	   In	   particular,	   when	   measurement	   is	   very	   noisy,	   the	   expected	  
estimate	  under	  the	  alternative	  hypothesis	  will	  be	  strongly	  biased	  toward	  zero	  and	  thus	  very	  similar	  to	  
the	  prediction	  of	  the	  null	  hypothesis.	  Besides,	  the	  alternative	  hypothesis	   is	  rarely	   if	  ever	  specified	  as	  a	  
precise	  number,	  let	  alone	  the	  one	  actually	  later	  estimated.	  This	  issue	  would	  require	  a	  longer	  detour	  into	  
statistics	  and	  is	  beyond	  the	  scope	  of	  this	  paper.30	  The	  important	  takeaway,	  however,	  is	  that	  limitations	  
of	   the	  data	  and	  data	  analysis	   remain	   important	   for	   interpretation	  of	   the	   results	   even	   if	   the	   latter	   are	  
“statistically	  significant.”	  
An	  approximate	   litmus	  test	   is	   to	  what	  extent	  an	  estimated	  coefficient	  of	  zero	  would	  be	  considered	  as	  
evidence	   against	   the	   alternative	   hypothesis.	   The	   less	   this	   is	   the	   case,	   the	   less	   the	   predictions	   of	   the	  
alternative	  hypothesis	  differ	   from	   the	  null	  when	  allowance	   is	  made	   for	  measurement	  error	  and	  other	  
design	  issues;	  hence,	  the	  less	  one	  can	  learn	  from	  the	  evidence.	  For	  example,	   if	  estimates	  with	  a	  crude	  
index	  would	  be	  considered	  uninformative	  if	  they	  were	  close	  to	  zero,	  they	  should	  be	  considered	  similarly	  
uninformative	  if	  they	  happen	  to	  be	  large	  and	  “significant.”	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29	  In	   theory,	   p-­‐values	   can	   be	   adjusted	   to	   account	   for	   such	   multi-­‐testing	   (e.g.,	   Benjamini	   &	   Hochberg	   1995).	   In	  
practice,	   this	   does	   not	   work	   to	   the	   extent	   the	   multi-­‐testing	   is	   done	   by	   different	   researchers	   unaware	   of	   each	  
others’	  work.	  
30	  See,	  e.g.,	  Strnad	   (2007,	   sect.2.2).	  Bayesian	  statistics	   formally	   integrates	  data	  and	  prior	  beliefs,	   including	  about	  
aspects	   of	   the	   study	   design	   (e.g.,	   Gelman	   et	   al.	   2013).	   It	   allows	   precise	   treatment	   of,	   e.g.,	   doubts	   about	   the	  
strength	  and	  exogeneity	  of	  instruments	  discussed	  in	  Section	  4.3	  (Conley	  et	  al.	  2012).	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As	  a	  practical	  matter,	  the	  foregoing	  precludes	  credible	  tests	  of	  effects	  that	  must	  be	  small	  relative	  to	  the	  
noise.	  In	  particular,	  comparative	  data	  cannot	  be	  sensibly	  used	  to	  test	  the	  effect	  of	  technical	  rules	  on	  big	  
picture	  outcomes	  such	  as	  GDP	  growth	  that	  are	  the	  product	  of	  a	  large	  number	  of	  factors.	  Instead,	  focus	  
should	   be	   directed	   to	   the	   technical	   rules’	   effects	   on	   less	   distant	   outcomes.	   For	   example,	   to	   test	   the	  
effect	   of	   culture	   on	   property	   protection,	   Dari-­‐Mattiacci	   &	   Guerriero	   (2015)	   collected	   data	   on	   one	  
directly	  pertinent	  and	  easily	  measurable	  variable,	  namely	   the	  number	  of	  years,	   if	  ever,	  after	  which	  an	  
illegally	  dispossessed	  owner	  of	  a	  moveable	  good	  loses	  her	  property	  rights	  to	  a	  bona	  fide	  purchaser.	  
Because	   comparative	   evidence	   is	   limited,	   it	   is	   imperative	   to	   test	   the	   theory’s	   assumptions	   or	  
implications	  also	  in	  domestic	  settings.	  For	  example,	  Linos	  (2013)	  used	  survey	  evidence	  from	  the	  United	  
States	  to	  bolster	  her	  claim	  that	   foreign	  and	   international	  models	   legitimate	  policy	  options	  and,	  hence,	  
diffuse.	  This	  evidence	  is	  particularly	  powerful	  because	  the	  size,	  geopolitical	  dominance,	  and	  geographic	  
isolation	   of	   the	   United	   States	  made	  US	   voters	   least	   likely	   to	   be	   so	   influenced	   (this	   argument	   for	   the	  
power	   of	   the	  US	   evidence	   is	   known	   as	  most	   difficult	   case	   logic;	   Hirschl	   2006).	   Similarly,	   Cassar	   et	   al.	  
(2014)	   bolstered	   claims	   that	   well-­‐functioning	   legal	   institutions	   increase	   trust	   with	   experimental	  
evidence.	  By	   contrast,	   the	   claim	   that	   legal	   origin	  matters	  became	  much	   less	  plausible	  when	  domestic	  
evidence	   did	   not	   fit	   the	   theory	   that	   archetypical	   differences	   between	   common	   and	   civil	   law,	   such	   as	  
reliance	   on	   case	   law,	   caused	   the	   tested	   outcomes	   (for	   example,	   the	   driving	   force	   of	   US	   investor	  
protection	  turns	  out	  to	  be	  statutes,	  not	  case	  law).	  
6.	  	   Conclusion	  
Comparative	  information	  is	  important	  to	  assess	  causal	  claims.	  Nevertheless,	  this	  article	  cautions	  against	  
drawing	   overly	   strong	   conclusions	   from	   comparative	   data	   alone.	   From	   an	   individual	   researcher’s	  
perspective,	   it	   is	   tempting	   to	   brush	   aside	   these	   concerns	   and	   “just	   do	   it.”	   After	   all,	   unlike	   in	   other	  
disciplines,	  there	  is	  no	  risk	  of	  being	  proven	  wrong	  by	  a	  controlled	  experiment.	  In	  fact,	  there	  is	  not	  even	  a	  
risk	  that	  another	  researcher	  will	  obtain	  different	  results	  on	  a	  different	  sample-­‐-­‐-­‐there	  is	  only	  one	  planet	  
Earth.	  But	   from	   the	  perspective	  of	   the	  discipline	  as	  a	  whole,	   the	   inability	   to	  weed	  out	  errors	   through	  
replication	   is	  all	   the	  more	  reason	  to	   look	  critically	  at	  empirical	   findings.	  Otherwise,	  erroneous	   findings	  
will	   pile	   up	   and	   blur	   our	   vision,	   and	   the	   incentive	   to	   publish	   such	   findings	   will	   divert	   attention	   from	  
higher-­‐value	  targets.	  
We	  will	  do	  better	  if	  we	  are	  clear	  about	  the	  strengths	  and	  weaknesses	  of	  comparative	  data.	  Comparative	  
data	   will	   rarely	   if	   ever	   sort	   out	   causal	   questions	   by	   themselves.	   That	   being	   said,	   they	   can	   be	   an	  
extremely	  important	  piece	  in	  a	  broader	  empirical	  and	  theoretical	  analysis.	  Theories	  gain	  strength	  if	  they	  
fit	  the	  comparative	  facts,	  and	  lose	   it	   if	  they	  do	  not.	  Thus,	  establishing	  comparative	  facts	  through	  high-­‐
quality	  data	  collection	  should	  be	  the	  first	  priority.	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